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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade or so, the United States has been the arena of a
boisterous debate regarding the creation of a new regulatory framework for
the approval of generic versions' of biologics-based pharmaceutical prod-
1. In this Article, the terms "generics" or "generic versions" will be used to refer to
imitations and follow-on versions of already approved drug products, which are the subject of
an application for marketing submitted to the FDA. Applications for generic versions of drug
products typically attempt to rely on FDA findings of safety and efficacy reached as part of the
FDA's review of the already approved version of the relevant drug product.
Notably, the term "generic biologics" in and of itself has spawned a considerable amount
of controversy, as the nomenclature in the area of biologics seems to be perceived as dictating
the discussion's results. See, e.g., Follow-On Protein Products: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight & Government Reform, I 10th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock,
M.D., Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food, and Drug Administration), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/04/t20070326a.html [hereinafter Woodcock Statement]
(addressing the issue of terminology and explaining why she prefers the term 'follow-on pro-
tein products'); WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33901,
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION ISSUES, 3 (2008) [here-
inafter 2008 CRS REPORT] ("many experts do not describe competing biologic products as
'generics,' as is the case for small-molecule pharmaceuticals; the term 'follow-on biologic' is
commonly used instead"); Henry G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley, & Kevin A. Schulman,
Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECoN. 439, 449
n. 1 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=992479 (asserting
that while "[t]hroughout the paper we refer to 'generic biologics' for the sake of symmetry
with generic pharmaceuticals[,] [t]he term 'follow-on biologic' might be more appropriate ...
given that the product might be required to complete clinical trials to demonstrate similar
safety and efficacy to the originator"). The particular term used in the context of the new
healthcare reform act to indicate that a product is an imitation of another already approved
product is "biosimilar" (rather than "biogeneric," "generic biologic," "follow-on biologic,"
"generic biological product," etc.). However, given how innate the term "generic" has become
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ucts (also known as "biological products" and "biologics" 2) 3-an important
and increasingly growing class of drugs.4 The basic purpose of such a
to the legal discussion of regulated imitation-products, and its wide use in the context of drug
law, in this Article I will use the term "generic" as mentioned above.
2. The FDA defines a biological product as "any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, anti-
toxin, or analogous product applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or
injuries of man." Biological Products, 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h) (2008). According to the FDA
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER),
[b]iological products include a wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and
blood components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombi-
nant therapeutic proteins. Biologics can be composed of sugars, proteins, or nucleic
acids or complex combinations of these substances, or may be living entities such
as cells and tissues. Biologics are isolated from a variety of natural sources-
human, animal, or microorganism-and may be produced by biotechnology meth-
ods and other cutting-edge technologies . ... Biological products often represent
the cutting-edge of biomedical research and, in time, may offer the most effective
means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions that presently have no
other treatments available....
In contrast to most drugs, which are chemically synthesized and have a known
structure, most biologics are complex mixtures that are not easily identified or
characterized. Biological products, including those manufactured by biotechnology,
tend to be heat sensitive and susceptible to microbial contamination.
What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/u
cml33077.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) [hereinafter CBER FAQ]; see also Public Health
Service Act, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 § 351(i) (1944) (PHSA) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)
(2006)) ("the term 'biological product' means a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product ...
applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.").
Accordingly, in this Article, I will use the terms "biologics" and "biological products" to refer
to pharmaceutical products whose manufacturing involves the use of living organisms and will
distinguish them from "small molecule drugs" (or "drugs" for short). For further discussion of
the differences between biologics and small molecule drugs and the possible implications of
these differences on frameworks for the approval of generic versions of biological products,
see generally Biotechnology Indus. Org., The Difference with Biologics: The Scientific, Legal,
and Regulatory Challenges of Any Follow-On Biologics Scheme, BIO, 6-8 (Apr. 25, 2007),
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/WhitePaper.pdf [hereinafter BIO WHITE PAPER]; Donna
M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an
Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 35 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 555, 560 (2008); Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGis. 363, 367-78 (2007).
3. See generally Tam Q. Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Gener-
ic Biologics Under Existing Lw and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77
(2007) (discussing the debate regarding the FDA's authority to create an abbreviated regulato-
ry pathway for the approval of generic versions of biological products); Jeremiah J. Kelly &
Michael David, No Longer "If " But "When": The Coming of Abbreviated Approval Pathway
for Follow-On Biologics, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 115, 116 (2009) (reviewing the history of the
debate over a U.S. regulatory scheme for the approval of generic biologics).
4. See generally 2008 CRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2 (discussing the importance
of biologics as a class of drugs); ROBERT J. SHAPIRO ET AL., THE POTENTIAL AMERICAN
MARKET FOR GENERIC BIOLOGICAL TREATMENTS AND THE ASSOCIATED COST SAVINGS, 1-3
(2008), available at http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/0208_GeneicBiologicsStudy.pdf
Spring 2012] 421
422 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
framework is to create a fast and less-costly route to FDA approval for bio-
logics that would be similar or identical to already-approved biological
products-typically ones that are sold on the market at monopoly rates-
thereby allowing cheaper versions of such medicines to enter the market.
One of the main points of contention in creating the framework for the
approval of generic biologics has been the length of the exclusivity period
granted to developers of original biologics during which generic competitors
are not allowed to enter the market.' On March 21, 2010, as part of the
(describing the importance of biologics as a class of drugs, the growing numbers of biological
products, important research done in the area of biologics, and their economic impact); Liang,
supra note 2, at 363-64 (describing the prominence of biologics in the worldwide drug mar-
ket). The importance of biologics lies in their structural and functional variety, which in turn
embodies unprecedented therapeutic promise. Already, approved biologics include "wonder
drugs" used to treat diseases and maladies that could not be treated effectively by small-
molecule drugs and in many cases used to be considered fatal. Examples of biologics include
anti-cancer antibodies such as Herceptin and Avastin, anti-arthritis products such as Enbrel
and Remicade, insulin products such as Humulin for the treatment of diabetes, erythropoietin
products such as Procrit, clotting factor VIll for the treatment of hemophilia, and Aranesp
for the stimulation of growth of red blood cells in people suffering from blood disorders
such as anemia.
5. Since the imposition of competition on a previously monopolized market is ex-
pected to be accompanied by a drop in the price of the biological product, it is in the best
interest of the monopolist to make its monopoly period last as long as possible. There are a
variety of positions on the appropriate length of such periods of exclusivity. Different pro-
posals over the past few years suggested setting the length of exclusivity period, in years, at 0,
3 to 6, 7, 10, 12 to 12.5, 12 to 14.5, 12 to 15, 13 to 16, 17, etc. See BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS.
ORG. (BIO), A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS REGIME WITHOUT STRONG DATA EXcLusIvITY WILL
STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES I (2007), available at http://www.bio.org/
sites/default/files/FOBSData exclusivity_20070926_-0.pdf [hereinafter BIO DATA ExCLUSIvI-
TY POSITION PAPER] (advocating a data exclusivity period for biologics of "no less than
fourteen years"); ALEX M. BRILI, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC
BIOLOGICS: A CRITIQUE 11 (2008), available at http://www.tevadc.com/Brill-Exclusivity
in-Biogenerics.pdf (critiquing Grabowski's determination that the proper data exclusivity
period should be 12.9 to 16.2 years and arguing that under a "more plausible set of circum-
stances" the proper data exclusivity period should be around 10 years); Gitter, supra note 2, at
615-16 (reviewing different positions on the length of the exclusivity period that should be
afforded to original biological products); Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for Biologics:
What Is the Appropriate Period ?f Protection?, 10 AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES.
HEALTH Pot'Y OUTLOOK, Sept. 2009, at 1, http://www.aei.org/files/2009/09/08/10-HPO-
Grabowski-SepO8-g.pdf [hereinafter Grabowski 2009] (reiterating the author's position, as
expressed in previous articles, that the minimum period of exclusivity should be set at twelve
years); Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Data Erclusivity and the Balance Between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEws DRUG DIsCovERY 479, 486 (2008) [herein-
after Grabowski 2008] (advocating a data exclusivity period of 12.9 to 16.2 years); LAURENCE
J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOGICS INDUSTRY: A BALANCED AP-
PROACH TO MARKETING EXCLUSIVITY (Sept. 2008), available at http://people.bu.edulkotlikof/
New%20Kotlikoff%20Web%20Page/Kotlikoff Innovation in. Biologics2 1.pdf (arguing that
granting developers of original biologics exclusivity periods of twelve to fifteen years would
create overly long monopoly periods that would distort the economy of pharmaceuticals and
calling for limiting exclusivity periods in biologics to lengths such as those granted under the
Hatch-Waxman Act); Teva Discusses Follow-On Biologics, Initiatives for 2009, 8 DRUG IN-
DUS. DAILY (Feb. 2009) (discussing Teva's call for a seven-year exclusivity period); John A.
[Vol. 18:419
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healthcare reform act, Congress settled this debate by enacting the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 ("BPCIA"), which provides
statutory exclusivity6 periods of 12 to 12.5 years for original biologics from
the date of FDA approval.7 This 12- to 12 .5-year statutory exclusivity period
Vernon, Alan Bennett, & Joseph H. Golec, Exploration of Potential Economics of Follow-On
Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH.
L. 55, 56 (2010) ("[Tihere should be 17 years of data exclusivity for new biologics."); Henry
Grabowski & Joseph DiMasi, Biosimilar Data Exclusivity, and the Incentives for Innovation:
A Critique of Kotlikoff's White Paper 4-5 (Duke Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No.
2009-02, 2009), available at http://econ.duke.edu/Papers/PDFIFinalDraft2_5_09.pdf (criticiz-
ing Kotlikoff's argument against granting a twelve- to fifteen-year data or exclusivity period)
[hereinafter Grabowski & DiMasi 2009]; Henry Grabowski, Genia Long, & Richard Morti-
mer, Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics: Updating Prior Analyses and Responding
to Critiques 2, 30 (Duke Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-10, 2008) available
at http://econ.duke.edulPapers/PDF/Data_- ExclusivityPeriods forBiologics.pdf (reiterating
Grabowski's call for a twelve- to sixteen-year exclusivity period) [hereinafter Grabowski et
al.]; see also infra note 71. But see FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES:
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIc DRUG COMPETITION v-vii (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2009/061PO83901 biologicsreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (recommending against grant-
ing statutory exclusivity in biological products in addition to existing patent protection and
determining that it is likely that generic competition in biologics will develop without any
special legislative incentives).
Notably, in Europe original biological products are afforded a ten- to eleven-year statuto-
ry exclusivity period consisting of eight years of data exclusivity during which it is not
possible to file applications for generic versions of the biological product; two more years of
market exclusivity, during which generic applications cannot be approved; and an additional
optional one year for approval of additional treatment indications for the same product. See
Commission Regulation 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 11, 14 (EC). For further discussion of
the European regulatory framework for the approval of generic biologics, see generally Kelly
& David, supra note 3, at 122-23; Liang, supra note 2, at 397-408.
6. For purposes of the discussion in this Article, a "statutory exclusivity" period is
defined as the period of time designated in legislation during which the FDA or any other
statutorily designated entity is barred from approving a generic version of a product or taking
other action mandated in legislation which would pave the road for competition in that prod-
uct. The effect of such statutory impediment is a de facto grant of a competitive advantage to
the party owning or making the original version of the product. Cf Bruce S. Manheim et al.,
'Follow-On Biologics': Ensuring Continued Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry, 25
HEALTH AFF. 394, 394 (2006), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgilcontent/full/
25/2/394 (defining "statutory exclusivity" as "the period of time in which the FDA is barred
from approving a follow-on product"). For further discussion of statutory exclusivities and the
difference between statutory exclusivities and intellectual property rights, such as patents, see
infra Part I.B-C. Two examples of statutory exclusivities existing in the context of FDA regu-
lation are those afforded under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984 and the Orphan Drug Act. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as
amended in different sections of 15, 21, 35 and 42 U.S.C.); Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
414, 6 Stat. 2049 (1983). For further discussion of these Acts and the statutory exclusivities
they confer see infra Part lB.
7. The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) was enacted as part
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-7002, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (adding § 351(k)(7) to the PHSA ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944)). See
discussion infra Part II.C. Importantly, in February 2011 as part of its 2012 Budget Proposal,
the Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President published a
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predominantly overlaps with patent protection on the underlying biological
product and is about 5 to 11 months shorter than the average remaining
period of such patent protection on the original product.
This redundancy raises questions regarding the need for and purpose of
having patents in inventions related to biologics in addition to statutory ex-
clusivities. What justification is there, if any, for such double-layered
protection in biologics? Assuming that such justification or need for double
protection does exist, why should biologics be the only kind of technology
to benefit from it? Could the statutory exclusivity regime in biologics mark
the dawn of a new era in the protection and incentivizing of innovation and
the beginning of a gradual replacement of the old patent system with mod-
ern schemes of statutory exclusivities; or is it just a peculiar case of a legal
regime shaped by an unusually powerful industry? In this Article I will seek
to address these questions and propose some answers.
Part I of this Article will review fundamental patent theory concepts
necessary for the discussion and compare them with statutory exclusivities,
with emphasis on the statutory exclusivity scheme created under the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Part 1I will describe the current regulation of biologics in the
United States and review the framework for the approval of generic biolog-
ics under BPCIA. Comparing statutory exclusivities and patent protection in
the context of biologics, Part III will discuss the merits of these two regimes
from a public policy perspective, address the possible ramifications of hav-
ing both statutory exclusivities and patent protection in biologics, and
culminate in a call for the suspension of patent enforcement rights with rela-
tion to biological products that benefit from statutory exclusivities afforded
under BPCIA for the duration of such exclusivities.
proposal to shorten this exclusivity period to seven years. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
FIscAL YEAR 2012 TERMINATIONS, REDUCTIONS, AND SAVINGS 119 (2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/trs.pdf [hereinafter
BUDGET] ("The Administration is proposing to give consumers more access to affordable
pharmaceuticals by . . . reducing the exclusivity period for brand biologics to encourage faster
development of generic biologics . . . . Under the Administration proposal, beginning in 2012,
innovator brand biologic manufacturers would have 7 years of exclusivity."). Interestingly, this
proposal appears to be in line with the Administration's original position on the appropriate
length of statutory exclusivity that should be awarded in approved original biological prod-
ucts. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. Regardless, the discussion herein is based on
the law as it currently stands under BPCIA.
8. See discussion infra Part ilI.A.
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I. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITIES AND PATENTS AS
MECHANISMS OF PROTECTING AND ADVANCING
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
A. Patents
Dating as far back as the fifteenth century,9 patents10 are time-limited
monopolies granting the right to exclude others from using patented inven-
tions;" i.e., for a predefined period of time, patentees can dictate whether
and how third parties may practice the patented inventions and collect pay-
ments in exchange for the patentee's permission to do so. The literature on
patent theory is vast, but two theories dominate the underlying rationales for
having patent systems.12
1. Patents as Incentive to Disclose
According to this theory, patents embody a pact between inventors and
society: in exchange for revealing to society their inventions and the way to
utilize them, society grants inventors monopoly rights in their inventions for
a limited period of time.13 This patent theory presumes that inventors would
9. See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 166,
169 (1948).
10. In the context of this Article, unless stated otherwise, reference to "patents" is to the
modem form of patents of invention-i.e., utility patents-as opposed to design patents, plant
patents, and other types of patents.
I1. In the United States, the right to exclude includes the making, using, offering for
sale or selling of the invention, or importation of the invention into the United States. See 35
U.S.C. § 271(a); see also STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS
OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYs-
TEM I (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM] ("a patent
confers the right to secure the enforcement power of the state in excluding unauthorized
persons, for a specified number of years, from making commercial use of a clearly
identified invention").
12. Although it is generally accepted that inventive activity is responsive to economic
stimuli, the need for patents as effective and efficient means of providing such stimuli remains
the subject of debate. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclu-
sive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1031 (1989) ("There is
considerable empirical evidence suggesting that technological change has been an extremely
important source of economic growth over time, and that levels of invention are responsive to
economic stimuli. But it does not necessarily follow that patent protection is necessary to
preserve adequate economic incentives for invention and innovation."). Notably, the patent
theory literature recognizes additional rationales for patents. One proposition is that patents
are a natural right, because inventors have natural property rights in their ideas, and thus to
prevent theft of such ideas by unauthorized parties, society is morally obligated to afford in-
ventors a proprietary right in their inventions that would confer exclusivity in the invention.
See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 21. Another somewhat archaic
rationale for patents is that patents are a means of securing appropriate rewards, namely, that
principles of justice and "natural law" require that inventors receive rewards for their inven-
tions proportional to the inventions' usefulness to society. See id.
13. See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note II, at 21 (describing the
"exchange-for-secrets" thesis); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1022, 1028-30 ("In exchange for
425Spring 2012]
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have kept their inventions secret for as long as possible, but the exclusivity
is sufficient to convince them to disclose and explain their inventions and
thus benefit society.14 An underlying premise of this theory is that the re-
quired disclosure of the invention by the inventor, once made, will enable
the public to build upon the disclosed technology to further innovation."
These assumptions have been the subject of critique, especially in view of
arguments that many patents withhold vital information necessary for utiliz-
ing the inventions without additional, sometimes substantial,
research and development ("R&D"). 6
2. Patents as Incentive to Invent/Invest
A modern, broadly accepted perception of patents is as an instrument of
incentivizing invention by affording inventors an extra-competitive ad-
vantage over their competitors." Described as "the fundamental economic
justification of patents,"" the basic premise upon which this theory is based
is that under competitive conditions the profit made by inventors would not
be high enough to justify their investment and that in order to make in-
ventive activities worthwhile to inventors, society must ensure that the
inventors are able exploit their inventions to an extent that sufficiently com-
pensates them for their investment of time, money, and effort.19
Further evolvement of the incentive-to-invent theory views patents as
vital not only for the inventive activity itself but also for the industrial appli-
these exclusive rights, the patent statute requires the inventor to disclose the invention in the
patent application in terms sufficient to enable others who are 'skilled in the art' to make and
use it.").
14. See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 21; Eisenberg, supra
note 12, at 1028-30.
15. See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM. supra note I1, at 21.
16. See id. at 32-33; Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621, 626 (2010).
17. See EcoNoMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note II, at 21 (the "monopoly-
profit-incentive" thesis); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1024-26 ("The incentive to invent theory
holds that too few inventions will be made in the absence of patent protection because inven-
tions once made are easily appropriated by competitors of the original inventor who have not
shared in the costs of invention."). Notably, this perception of patents also seems to lie in the
heart of the Constitutional authorization of Congress to grant patents for the purpose of pro-
moting scientific progress. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8 ("[Congress shall have Power ... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries"). An important critique of the perception of
patents as incentive-to-invent argues that people would create and invent regardless of any
prospect of gain. See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 34 (quoting
Frank W. Taussig).
18. ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 32.
19. Id. at 32, 37, 39 (reviewing arguments made by several scholars, including A.T.
Hadley and Joseph Schumpeter); see also BRILL, supra note 5, at 6 ("The purpose of the pa-
tent system is to ensure that the inventor of a patented product receives monopoly market
conditions and can earn profit margins sufficient to induce the R&D costs associated with
bringing the product to market.").
426 [Vol. I18:419
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cation of resulting inventions,20 namely for the incentivizing of financing of
the steps necessary to put an invention into the market.2 1
Despite extensive criticism of the incentive-to-disclose and incentive-to-
invent/invest theories, 22 they offer means for evaluating the utility of patents.
Thus, in examining patents in the context of biologics, I will assume that
these patent theories are valid and capable of explaining, at least to some
extent, the need for patent protection for inventions in general and biotech-
nological inventions in particular.
B. Statutory Exclusivities
The classic view on monopolies, whether patent or otherwise, is that
they are generally harmful to society, but "a temporary monopoly granted to
an inventor [is] a good way of rewarding his risk and expense."2 3 This max-
im is equally applicable to both patents and other types of state-instituted
monopolies, such as statutory exclusivities. 24
20. For purposes of the discussion herein, this hypothesis will be referred to as the
"incentive-to-invest" theory. Notably, the invention/investment terminology used herein bears
similarity to the distinction drawn by some scholars between "invention" and "innovation."
For example, Eisenberg refers to the incentive-to-invest offshoot of the incentive-to-invent
rationale as a separate patent theory according to which patents are meant to promote "innova-
tion," namely investment in practical and commercial development of existing inventions. See
Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1024 n.29, 1037-45; see also Robert P. Merges, Commercial
Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 803,
807 (1988) ("An invention refers to the practical implementation of the inventor's idea. This
often takes the form of a prototype or model. An invention, then, is more than a concept (it is
usually a tangible thing), but less than the fully worked out product or process first offered for
sale to customers. An innovation is the 'debugged' and functional version of the invention: the
version first offered for sale.").
21. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1024 n.29, 1037-45; ECoNOMic REVIEW OF PA-
TENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 36 ("Financing the work that leads to the making of an
invention may be a relatively small venture compared with that of financing its introduction,
because costly development work, experimentation in production, and experimentation in
marketing may be needed before the commercial exploitation of the invention can begin.").
The incentive-to-invest theory is especially relevant to the medical products industry, in which
the expense associated with identifying a promising drug or biologic is often not remotely as
costly as putting it through clinical trials as required by the FDA.
22. See, e.g., 2008 CRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 18; Eisenberg, supra note 12, at
1026-30 (addressing the critiques on the incentive-to-disclose and incentive-to-invent theo-
ries); ECONOMic REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 22-25 (describing critiques of
arguments in favor of patent protection).
23. See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 19. But see BRILL,
supra note 5, at 11 (warning about the chilling effects of too-long monopoly periods and argu-
ing that "excessive monopoly protection by the government creates windfalls to innovators,
stifles competition and is costly to society").
24. For example, the sui generis rights under the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA),
Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified at various sections in 7 U.S.C.); the Semi-
conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006)); and the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860, 2905 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. H§ 1301-1332 (2006)). Notably, the argu-
ments in favor of granting statutory exclusivities in biologics-encouraging innovation and
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As mentioned above, a statutory exclusivity is a time-limited monopoly
in a product or products that is the result of a bar on the entry of competitors
into the product's market. 25 The most significant example of statutory exclu-
sivities is that of the exclusivity periods granted under the Hatch-Waxman
Act.26 The Hatch-Waxman Act creates the regulatory pathway for the ap-
proval of generic versions of small-molecule drugs and provides for several
types of statutory exclusivities. First, the Hatch-Waxman Act offers a five-
year statutory exclusivity period available to original drug manufacturers for
receiving marketing approval of drugs containing therapeutic chemical
compounds that have not been previously approved for medical use.27 As I
will explain later in this Article, although the five-year new chemical entity
("NCE") exclusivity and 12- to 12.5-year statutory exclusivity under BPCIA
may seem like they are meant to function in the same way (as though the
12- to 12.5-year market exclusivity is "NCE exclusivity for biologics"), their
purpose is in fact quite different. 28 Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act cre-
ates a three-year statutory exclusivity period for conducting supplemental
clinical investigations that lead to the approval of a new medical use of an
already approved drug. 29 Finally, the Hatch-Waxman Act seeks to incentiv-
ize the creation of generic versions of drugs by granting a 180-day
exclusivity period to companies that are first to file applications for the mar-
enabling innovators to gain sufficient profit-bear striking resemblance to the incentive-to-
invent/invest patent rationale discussed above. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of the resemblance between the rationales for granting patents and stat-
utory exclusivities, see infra Part Ill.C.
25. See supra note 6. In terms of their effect, statutory exclusivities are highly similar to
patents. According to the Economic Review of the Parent System, patents have three character-
izing features: conditionality, limitation of time and scope, and their being awarded by society
for a recognizable reason. EcoNoMic REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note II, at 26
("most writers [writing about patents] want to make it understood that [patents] are not 'odi-
ous' monopolies but rather 'social monopolies,' 'general welfare monopolies,' or 'socially
earned' monopolies . .. [All patent monopolies] are 'limited and conditional.' ").
26. See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 6. For an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and its legislative history see generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FooD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999); see
also Gitter, supra note 2, at 568-73.
27. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006). This exclusivity period is commonly
known as "new chemical entity" (NCE) exclusivity. During the NCE period of exclusivity, a
generic version of the same drug cannot be approved. Id. However, a generic applicant may
file an application for the approval of a generic version of the drug after four years by chal-
lenging the patents related to the original product under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(ll). Such
a challenge would normally prompt the filing of a lawsuit by the patent owner, which would
trigger-regardless of the timing in which the challenge was made with relation to the NCE
exclusivity-an additional period of thirty months (or 7.5 years from the date of approval, if
the filing was made between NCE years four and five) during which the FDA may not approve
the generic application. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (West 2012). For further discus-
sion of the NCE exclusivity period and its underlying rationale, see infra Part II.C.
28. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
29. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)-(iv) (2006). This additional exclusivity period is
meant to incentivize further investment in R&D of a known drug.
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keting of generic versions of an original drug product. 30 However, in order
to receive the 180-day exclusivity, a generic applicant must challenge pa-
tents related to the original drug. 3' The flourishing generic drug market and
the entire generic drug industry are commonly viewed as attributable to this
statutory exclusivity scheme created under the Hatch-Waxman Act.32
Another important example of a statutory exclusivity framework is that
of the exclusivities granted under the Orphan Drug Act 33 to developers of
drugs for rare diseases 34 such as Huntington's disease, amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS) (Lou Gehrig's disease), and Tourette syndrome. 35 Under the
Orphan Drug Act, once an approved drug or biologic is approved and "des-
ignated under [21 U.S.C. § 360bb] for a rare disease or condition, the [FDA]
may not approve another application . . . for such drug for such disease or
condition for a [generic applicant] until the expiration seven years from the
date of the approval of the [drug or biologic] .36 The idea behind the legisla-
tion of the Orphan Drug Act was to increase insufficient financial incentives
under patent law, thereby making the development of drugs for rare diseases
financially feasible.37 The seven-year market exclusivity that is the crux of
the Orphan Drug Act is considered to have achieved its desired effect: since
its passage in 1983, more than 200 drugs and biologics for rare diseases and
30. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). The benefit embodied in the 180-day
exclusivity period for generic manufacturers lies in the recipient's ability to charge near-
monopoly prices for its generic version of the drug for the duration of the 180-day exclusivity
period. See Gitter, supra note 2, at 573 (noting that during the 180-day period the generic drug
"shares duopoly prices with the Brand-name drug").
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv)(11) (2006). Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act itself
incentivizes the challenging of patents related to the original drug product. In this respect, the
Hatch-Waxman Act seeks to abolish one monopoly by offering another, shorter one.
32. The Hatch-Waxman Act is considered a great success in terms of incentivizing
R&D activities in monetary terms due to the savings attributable to the approval of generic
versions of innovative drugs. See Gitter, supra note 2, at 586-87 (reviewing the reasons for
what the author describes as the "overall success" of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Liang, supra
note 2, at 365 (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act has been very successful in bringing
cheaper generic versions of drugs to the market while maintaining incentives for continued
innovation).
33. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360aa-360ee and 42 U.S.C. § 236 (2006)).
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2006) (defining "rare disease or condition"). The
definition of an orphan drug could also include "orphan" biologics approved under PHSA
§ 351.
35. See CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS FOR THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT I (2011), available
at http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/legislation/federalfooddrugandcosmeticactfdcact/
significantamendmentstothefdcact/orphandrugact/default.htm.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2006).
37. See CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS FOR THE ORPHAN DRUG AcT, supra note 35, 12,
4-5. Such orphan drug products may be entirely unpatentable and could still merit exclusivity
under the Orphan Drug Act. Id.
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conditions have been brought into the market as compared with fewer than
ten in the decade preceding the passage of the Act."
C. Patents and Statutory Exclusivities-
Similarities and Differences
The main difference between statutory exclusivities and patents involves
the nature or type of "right." 39 Patents result from a grant by an executive
agency-the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")-and
create a right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell,
or importing into the United States the object of the right, namely the inven-
tion as claimed.40 A patentee's right to exclude is correlated with the duty of
third parties not to use the invention without the patentee's permission.4 '
Statutory exclusivities, on the other hand, are the result of inaction by
an executive agency that effectuates a defacto monopoly status with respect
to a particular product. For example, the NCE exclusivity under the Hatch-
Waxman Act is a result of prohibiting the FDA from granting marketing
approvals for generic versions of the original drug for a period of five years
from the date of approval of that drug, thereby effectuating a five-year ex-
clusivity in that drug on its developer.42 In other words, the benefits of
statutory exclusivities to developers of original products are by-products of
the preclusion of potential competitors by an executive agency withholding
its permission to partake in a regulated activity. 43
38. See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Joel Waldfogel, Does Misery Iove Company? Evi-
dence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan Drug Act, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 335, 348 (2009) (arguing that the Orphan Drug Act "works"); Food
& Drug Admin., Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, available at
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/default.htm (last
updated Mar. 20, 2012).
39. This part of the discussion will utilize the terminology and distinctions proposed by
Hohfeld. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (providing background terminology).
40. Notably, patents are commonly mistaken for a positive right to use an invention.
The distinction between a right to use and a mere right to exclude others may be best illustrat-
ed where a patentee is unable to use her own invention but still has the right to exclude others
from using it. For example, if A's invention cannot be used without B's patented technology,
then A would be unable to use B's technology although A would certainly still be able to pre-
vent C from using A's technology even if C has a license from B to use B's technology.
41. See Hohfeld, supra note 39, at 32 ("A duty or a legal obligation is that which one
ought or ought not to do. 'Duty' and 'right' are correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a
duty is violated." (quoting Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Kurtz, 37 N.E. 303, 304 (Ind. App.
1894))).
42. See discussion of NCE exclusivities, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. For example. the FDA does not owe an original drug manufacturer a five-year mo-
nopoly status for having a new chemical entity approved for medical use. Rather, the FDA is
merely obliged to refrain, for a period of five years, from approving generic versions of the
particular chemical compound for the drug's indicated medical use. Put in Hohfeldian terms,
statutory exclusivities are the result of a privilege granted to applicant A to partake in certain
commercial activities requiring a license from an executive agency E. Yet the exclusivity itself
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The difference in the nature of the right conferred by patents and statu-
tory exclusivities dictates two additional important distinctions related to the
enforceability of the respective rights and their susceptibility to legal chal-
lenges. From an enforceability perspective, while patents give grantees the
right to preclude others from taking certain actions as they relate to the
inventions claimed by such patents," statutory exclusivities are merely im-
munities and confer no right per se (in the narrow Hohfeldian sense) on
their bearer.4 5 Accordingly, enforcement of patent rights necessitates actively
seeking relief from a court and, typically, requires significant investment of
resources. Statutory exclusivities, on the other hand, are "automatically en-
forced" by the regulatory bar that precludes the entry of potential
competitors into the relevant market and, thus, require no enforcement ac-
tion per se on the part of the parties benefiting from them. 4 6
Patents and statutory exclusivities also differ in their susceptibility to
legal challenges. Patents, while presumed valid,47 are subject to several dif-
ferent types of challenges, including those during post-grant proceedings
(such as reexamination),4 8 defense arguments in patent infringement suits,49
is not the result of the privilege but rather of an immunity of A from having its monopoly sta-
tus changed which correlates to a non-ability of third parties C to abolish this monopoly status
of A by securing approval of their own generic products from agency E. See Hohfeld, supra
note 39, at 55 (discussing the concepts of immunity and disability).
44. See supra notes II and 40 and accompanying text.
45. It is possible to argue that from a legal standpoint the beneficiaries of statutory
exclusivities could secure certain legal rights, e.g., if agency E, for some reason, goes ahead
and approves an application of third party C prior to the expiration of the relevant statutory
exclusivity period, applicant A may be entitled to recover damages from agency E at the
amount that A could have reasonably expected to gain from its monopoly status had agency E
not approved C's application. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the type of
right per Hohfeld and the legal right. See, e.g., Hohfeld, supra note 39, at 43-44 (explaining
that there are "innumerable cases in which the mental and physical facts . . . [are] confused
with the legal relation which they create").
46. See BRILL, supra note 5, at 6 ("[d]ata exclusivity is a definitive monopoly and a
government grant, as it allows the innovator's data to be protected without challenge"); Joyce
Wing Yan Tam, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of Biotechnology, Patent law, and
Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. L.J. 535, 553 (2010) ("Marketing exclusivities are par-
ticularly powerful.... [t]his perfect monopoly protection is automatic and does not require the
entity holding the market exclusivity to act-a sharp contrast to patent rights, which are only
enforced when the patent holder prevails in a legal action."). However, a party benefiting from
a statutory exclusivity could attempt to preserve and possibly even extend its monopoly by
filing a citizen petition requesting the FDA to take certain actions (e.g., imposing increased
testing requirements on generic applicants) or refrain from taking certain actions (e.g., approv-
ing a generic application). See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2001).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("[a] patent shall be presumed valid").
48. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-05 (2006).
49. Patent infringement suits initiated under the Hatch-Waxman Act normally fall under
this category. Namely, the third party generic applicant makes a certification under 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) that the patents covering the original drug product are "invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted." Such certifications constitute acts of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
See discussion supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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and suits for a declaratory judgment.50 Such challenges could and often do
result in the partial or complete invalidation of the challenged patents.5 I
Hence, it is possible to say that patents are substantially exposed to legal
challenges throughout their term.
Statutory exclusivity status, however, can only be contested by chal-
lenging the relevant agency's inaction (i.e., omission), e.g., by disputing the
agency's "failure" to approve an application to partake in the particular
regulated activity that is the subject of the exclusivity. Since such a chal-
lenge would essentially argue that the agency should have approved the
additional, later application, its prospects of success in court are not high
from the outset. 52 Thus, statutory exclusivities are substantially less suscep-
tible to legal challenges than patents.
Having laid down some of the foundations necessary for a discussion of
patents and statutory exclusivities in the context of biologics, I will now
provide background on the regulation of biological products.
50. Suits for declaratory judgment may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. But see
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (abbreviated as FFDCA, FDCA, or FD&C), ch. 675,
52 Stat. 1040, H§ 505, 512 (1938) (providing exceptions to one's ability to sue for declaratory
judgment).
51. For example, patents are susceptible to challenges involving their novelty and non-
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, their compliance with the various requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 112, their being directed to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and
so forth.
52. Under current Supreme Court precedent, challenging executive agencies' inaction is
likely to be unsuccessful. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has
recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an
agency's absolute discretion."). The low likelihood of success of an attempt to challenge execu-
tive agencies' inaction is especially true in the context of drug law. See id. at 835-36 (rejecting
the argument that the FFDCA's prohibitions of "misbranding" and the introduction of "new
drugs" absent agency approval supply courts with "law to apply" and, accordingly, that they do
not provide a basis for judicial review of an FDA decision not to take enforcement action in the
area of drug law); see also BRILL, supra note 5, at 6 ("Data exclusivity is not challengeable in
court.").
Although statutory exclusivities per se may be relatively unsusceptible to legal challeng-
es, it is quite possible that an agency's interpretation and application of laws instituting such
exclusivities would be subject to legal challenges. However, such challenges would be subject
to the exacting review standard of the Chevron Doctrine. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that "considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme. . ." and
that so long as (1) "Congress has [not] directly spoken to the precise question at issue" and (2)
"the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute," then "the principle
of deference to administrative interpretations [should be] followed").
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II. THE REGULATION OF BIOLOGICS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Approval of Biologics License
Applications Under PHSA § 351
In order to introduce a biological product into interstate commerce, the
product's developer must first receive a biologics license from the FDA. 53
Under FDA regulations, the FDA may grant a biologics license pursuant to
the submission of a biologics license application ("BLA") showing that the
biological product is sufficiently safe, effective, and pure.5 4 Demonstrating
compliance with the FDA's safety, efficacy, and purity standards normally
requires having the biological product undergo extensive and lengthy R&D
and regulatory approval processes. 5 Naturally, these R&D and approval
efforts impose significant financial burdens on BLA applicants. The price of
putting a new biological product on the market is commonly estimated at
around $1.24 to 1.32 billion on average for a typical product.56 As a result,
biologics are usually very expensive."
53. Under PHSA § 351(a)(1)(A), "[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduc-
tion into interstate commerce any biological product unless ... a biologics license is in effect
for the biological product." Notably, the FDA has approved several biologics through regulato-
ry pathways created by FFDCA, e.g., human insulin products such as Humulin and Humalog,
human growth hormone products such as Humatrope, Norditropin, and Saizen, and more. See
Vernon et al., supra note 5, at 59-60 (discussing approval of some biologics under the frame-
work of FFDCA). These biologics have mostly been well-known, less structurally-complex
compounds and in some cases are versions of already-approved biologics that have gone off-
patent. However, such cases are an exception to the general rule that biologics are subject to
the approval processes set forth primarily in PHSA, and it is likely that the formation of a
regulatory pathway for the approval of generic biologics under BPCIA (see infra Part II.C)
would marginalize them even further. Thus, in analyzing implications of BPCIA, I will as-
sume that future regulation of biologics is going to be done primarily, if not exclusively, under
PHSA.
54. See PHSA § 351(a)(2)(B)(i)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 600.2 (2011).
55. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.2(a), 601.20, 601.25, 601.27, 601.70 (2012). For further
discussion of the typical length of the development of biological products, see infra Part Il.A.
56. See Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical
R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcoN. 469, 475 (2007) (estimating
the cost of putting a typical biologic on the market, including success in obtaining regulatory
marketing approval, at around $1.24-1.33 billion (2005 U.S. dollars)) [hereinafter DiMasi &
Grabowski]; Gitter, supra note 2, at 567, 589 (reviewing the significant investment required
from biologics' manufacturers as compared to small-molecule drugs); KOTLIKOFF, supra note
5, at 8 ("bringing a new biologic medication to market is exceptionally expensive-an esti-
mated $1.24 billion"); Vernon et al., supra note 5, at 66-68 (discussing the high costs involved
in the development and manufacturing of biologics). These high development costs are at least
partially attributable to the fact that only about one in three biological products that start clini-
cal trials eventually receive FDA approval. See BIO WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 4 ("[I]t is
estimated that less than a third of the biopharmaceuticals that enter clinical trials ever receive
marketing approval.").
57. The annual price of some biologics tends to be very high; some could cost over
$100,000 or, in rare instances, even over $300,000 a year. See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at i
("[A]nnual treatment for breast cancer with ... Herceptin can cost $48,000 and the annual
treatment for rheumatoid arthritis with Remicade can cost approximately $20,000."); Kathleen
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While the high prices of biologics may be justified, they also give rise to
concerns of possible abuses of market position by manufacturers of original
biologics. Some commentators have argued that manufacturers of original
biological products use the high entry barriers into the biologics market"-
the result of the significant time, money, and expertise necessary in order to
put biologics on the market-to charge very high prices for their products
well after they have recouped their development costs.5 9 One of the pro-
posed solutions for this perceived market failure is the creation of a
regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions of biologics.60
B. Regulatory Pathways for the Approval of
Generic Pharmaceuticals-Background
As demonstrated by the generic scheme created under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, regulatory frameworks for the approval of generic pharmaceuticals are
established on the premise that identical or highly similar compounds are as-
sumed to be equally or similarly safe and effective' and therefore require
R. Kelleher, FDA Approval of Generic Biologics: Finding a Regulatory Pathway, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 245, 252 (2007) (discussing the reasons for the relatively high
prices of biologics); SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 4 (listing the high costs of several prominent
biologics); Editorial, When a Drug Costs $300,000, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/opinion/23sun3.html (discussing the high annual cost of
some biologics used for treating rare diseases); Kendra Marr, Biotech Campaigns for Easier
Access to Generic Drug Market, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at DI ("[t]reatment [with bio-
logics] can cost a patient more than $30,000 a year, prohibiting many from obtaining drugs").
58. See Gitter, supra note 2, at 589-90 (recognizing the high entry barriers faced by
generic manufacturers seeking to enter the biologics market); Sarah Sorscher, Note, A Longer
Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the Implications of Data Exclusivity as a Tool for In-
novation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 285, 304 (2009) (discussing the high entry barriers
into the generic biologics market, especially as compared to the entry barriers faced by manu-
facturers of generic small-molecule drugs).
59. See Dinh, supra note 3, at 79 ("Besides the expenses of R&D and clinical trials, the
high cost of biologics results from monopoly pricing of brand-name biologics ... after patent
expiration because the regulatory approval process delays the market entry of competing
products."); Kelleher, supra note 57, at 252-53 (arguing that biologics are unjustifiably expen-
sive and that the lack of competition in biologics costs the U.S. economy billions of dollars
annually).
60. The institution of a regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions of already
approved drugs was the solution chosen for a similar problem in the context of small-molecule
drugs. See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 6. The legislation of the Hatch-Waxman Act (and the
creation of the generic pharmaceutical industry that followed) was the result of the growing
awareness during the 1970s and early 1980s of a similar situation that existed with relation to
small-molecule drugs. For additional possible solutions to the market failure existing in the
area of biologics, see Sorscher, supra note 58, at 301-02 (reviewing additional mechanisms
for addressing the problem of diminished competition in the biologics market such as cost-
sharing and prize funding that could potentially facilitate access to proprietary biological
products' clinical data and manufacturing know-how).
61. See BIO WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 10 ("Being identical to the innovator prod-
uct allows FDA to rely on the innovator's safety and effectiveness data in determining that the
generic version of the product will be safe and effective."); Dawn Willow, The Regulation of
Biologic Medicine: Innovators' Rights and Access to Healthcare, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
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relatively little, if any, additional clinical testing prior to approval.62 The
sought-after result of such lowered testing requirements is that the develop-
ment costs of later products will be lower and, as a result, so will their
prices, thereby increasing their affordability and accessibility. In other
words, regulatory frameworks for the approval of generic versions of phar-
maceuticals seek to save the high development costs involved in putting a
candidate compound through all the stages of drug development by simply
ensuring its identity to or interchangeability with the original product.63
Such identity or interchangeability, in turn, is deduced based on comparison
of the original product with the generic product.'
PROP. 32, 39 (2006) ("The principle underlying [a determination that two compounds have the
same safety and efficacy profiles] is that the greater the degree of similarity or identity be-
tween two [compounds], the greater the confidence that their clinical performance will be
similar or the same.").
62. See Woodcock Statement, supra note 1, at 6 ("By establishing that the drug product
described in the [generic application] is the same as the approved innovator drug product, the
[]applicant can rely on the Agency's finding of safety and effectiveness for the approved
drug.... Therapeutic equivalents can be expected to have the same clinical effect and safety
profile when administered to patients under the conditions specified in the labeling."); FTC
REPORT, supra note 5, at ii ("Duplication of safety and efficacy information is costly, an inef-
ficient use of scarce resources, and, as the FDA has explained, raises ethical concerns
associated with unnecessary human testing.").
63. Notably, the ability to achieve such identity or comparability between the biological
compounds in the original biologic and the ones in a later, generic version of the biologic,
thereby allowing recognition of the generic version of the biologic as interchangeable with the
original product, has been a point of significant scientific and legal disagreement. For further
discussion of the issue of biosimilarity and bioequivalence of biological compounds, see
Woodcock Statement, supra note 1, at 1, 4, 7-12 (stating that there is general recognition that
the idea of "sameness" is not applicable to biologics in the same manner it is to small mole-
cule drugs, addressing the FDA's definitions for the terms "comparability," "therapeutic
equivalents," and "interchangeability," and reviewing the scientific challenges involved in
comparing proteins and approving two biologics as substitutable/interchangeable); 2008 CRS
REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-9, 22-23 (describing the scientific and legal dispute regarding
comparability of biological products); Dinh, supra note 3, at 90-94, 114-15; Gitter, supra
note 2, at 590-609 (arguing that current scientific knowledge enables making determinations
regarding comparability of two biologics sufficient to justify an abbreviated regulatory path-
way for the approval of protein-based biological products and making the case for such
regulation); Liang, supra note 2, at 370-78, 415-17 (reviewing the difficulties in replicating
biological compounds and the resulting safety concerns arising in the context of generic bio-
logics); Marr, supra note 57 (describing the debate surrounding the ability to achieve and
show similarity in biologics). The enactment of BPCIA seems to accept the premise that there
is a way to achieve and ascertain identity or similarity between two biological compounds.
64. The comparison is of both the structures of the respective compounds and their
physiological effects. See Willow, supra note 61, at 37 ("By establishing that the drug product
described in the [generic application] is the bioequivalent of the innovator drug product ap-
proved [by the FDA], the [generic] applicant can rely on the FDA's finding of safety and
effectiveness previously determined for its counterpart brand drug."). Notably, the generic
applicant does not need and is not expected to acquire the actual clinical safety and efficacy
data for the original product, which-while submitted to the FDA as part of the approval pro-
cess of the original product-is considered proprietary, but rather "refers" the FDA to such
data, which is already in the FDA's possession. See discussion infra note 159, 2.
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However, regulatory pathways for the approval of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts also invite free riding by generic manufacturers who do not participate in
the substantial investment normally involved in the R&D of pharmaceutical
products. 65 Thus, it is necessary to ensure that developers of original phar-
maceuticals are able to recoup their investment and reap profits sufficient to
incentivize continued R&D efforts. Both the Hatch-Waxman Act and
BPCIA rely on statutory exclusivities for this purpose.66 Despite differences
in the length and scope of these exclusivities, all essentially guarantee that
for a certain amount of time the government will not allow potential com-
petitors to enter the relevant market or take steps toward doing so. 67
C. The Framework for the Approval of Generic Biologics
Under the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act
With the increase in the prevalence of biologics, 61 there have been in-
creasing calls and proposals for the institution of a framework for the
65. See 2008 CRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 20-21 (demonstrating the differences
in cost and risk between development of an original new pharmaceutical and a generic
version thereof).
66. See supra Part L.B and infra Part II.C. I will argue later in this Article that the statu-
tory exclusivities afforded to developers of original pharmaceuticals under the Hatch-Waxman
Act are different from the ones instituted under BPCIA not only in their length-3 to 6 years
as compared to 12 to 12.5 years respectively-but also in their purpose and in the extent of
protection they afford to the interests of developers of original pharmaceutical products. See
infra Part II.C.
67. It is common to refer to two main types of exclusivities in the context of regulatory
frameworks for approval of generic pharmaceuticals products: (1) "market exclusivity" (also
sometimes referred to as "approval exclusivity" or as "generic exclusivity" when discussing
statutory exclusivities in general, namely not in the particular context of generic competition):
a period during which potential generic competitors are not allowed to enter the particular
product's market, which is typically enforced by a prohibition on the FDA to approve applica-
tions for comparable generic products for the duration of the exclusivity period; and (2) "data
exclusivity," which is a period of time during which potential generic competitors may not rely
on FDA findings of safety and efficacy of an earlier approved product necessary to support the
generic application, which is typically enforced by a prohibition on the submission of generic
applications for the duration of the exclusivity period. See Gitter, supra note 2, at 573 n.l 13
(defining "market exclusivity" and "generic exclusivity"); KOTLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 3, 5
(explaining what data and market exclusivities are); Mossinghoff, supra note 26, at 189 (ex-
plaining that a period of exclusivity during which a generic version of a drug cannot be
approved is generally referred to as "data exclusivity"). Notably, the terms "market exclusivi-
ty" and "data exclusivity" have been defined rather loosely in the literature and sometimes
have different meanings. See. e.g., Gitter, supra note 2, at 572 n. 108 (referring to "data exclu-
sivity" as the period during which the FDA cannot approve an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) for a generic drug). The Hatch-Waxman Act establishes three market
exclusivity periods (five years for NCE, three years for approval of a known drug for a new
indication, and 180 days for approval of a generic version further challenging the patents re-
lated to the original drug) and a data exclusivity period of four to five years. See 21 U.S.C.
H 355()(5)(F)(ii)-(iv) (2006).
68. See supra note 4.
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approval of generic versions of biologics.' As could be expected, some of
these proposals are more favorable to generic manufacturers while others
better represent the interests of developers of original biological products. 70
Yet almost all of the proposals mandate the institution of some statutory
exclusivity periods in original biologics, and especially a market exclusivity
period of twelve to fifteen years.7 '
The reoccurrence of a twelve-year period in many of the proposals is
not a coincidence. Rather, it is the result of a perception that "the effective
patent life for pharmaceuticals-the time remaining following FDA approv-
al-is approximately eleven to twelve years."72 Thus, an exclusivity period
69. See supra note 3. Some prominent proposals for the institution of a regulatory
pathway for approval of generic versions of biologics include Affordable Health Care for
America Act, H.R. 3962, 11Ith Cong. §§ 2575-77 (2009) (AHCAA) (highly similar to
BPCIA); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.
§§ 7001-02 (2009) (BPCIA); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th
Cong. (2009) (PPACA) (the Senate vehicle for healthcare reform legislation, which was
passed by the Senate by a Yay-Nay vote 60-39 on December 24, 2009); Promoting Innovation
and Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. (2009) (PIALSMA); Path-
way for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 1548, 111 th Cong. (PBA); Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R.
5629, 110th Cong. (2008) (PFBA); Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th
Cong. (2007) (ALSMA); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 1695,
110th Cong. (2007) (BPCIA 2007); Patient Protection and Innovation Biologic Medicines Act
of 2007, H.R. 1956, 110th Cong. (2007) (PPIBMA).
70. For example, ALSMA and PIALSMA were considered more "pro-generic" as they
generally set more lenient comparability standards, shorter exclusivity periods for original
products, and better incentives for potential competitors to enter the market than "pro-
innovators" bills such as PPIBMA and PBA, which set stringent comparability standards and
long exclusivity periods for developers of original biological products. See ALSMA, relevant
sections to be added as PHSA §§ 351(k)(4) and (10); PIALSMA, relevant sections to be added
as PHSA §§ 351(k)(1)-(3), (5)(B) and (8)-(11); PBA, relevant sections to be added as PHSA
§§ 351(k)(2), (4), (6)-(7) and (9); and PPIBMA, relevant sections to be added as PHSA
§§ 351(k)(2)(D) and (3)-(6).
71. Under PPIBMA, developers of original biologics would have received exclusivity
periods of 12 to 15 years; under BPCIA 2007, BPCIA, and AHCAA, 12 to 12.5 years; under
PFBA and PBA, 12 to 14.5 years; and under PIALSMA, up to 6 years. The exception was
ALSMA, which did not provide for exclusivity to developers of original biologics. See supra
note 69.
The length of exclusivity periods to be afforded to original biologics also was the subject
of a heated debate regarding the optimum period of delay of generic entry into the market. See
Gitter, supra note 2, at 613-16 (reviewing some of the proposals for exclusivity periods in
original biological products). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to assess what is the
"optimum period" of monopoly in the context of biologics, according to the Economic Review
of the Patent System, "there will always be the possibility of very expensive developments
that cannot be profitable even if a 30- or 50-year monopoly grant were promised." See Eco-
Nomic REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I, at 39.
72. See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at vi ("The economic model put forth by pioneer
drug manufacturers to justify [a 12- to 14-year exclusivity period] is based on the average time
required to recoup the investment to develop and commercialize a typical biologic drug.");
Gitter, supra note 2, at 616; Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 4 ("The average market exclu-
sivity period for small molecule drugs in the United States is approximately twelve years.").
But see BRILL, supra note 5, at 8; KOTLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 6.
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of about twelve years would presumably provide developers of original bio-
logics with the assurance that the return on their investment would justify
the time, money, and effort they expended in developing their
products.73 Notably, the need for assurance in the case of biologics reflects
an underlying assumption that patents alone cannot provide sufficient pro-
tection to the interests of developers of biological products.7 4
Eventually, after years of debate, on March 21, 2010, Congress enacted
BPCIA as part of the healthcare reform act" and on March 23, 2010, Presi-
dent Obama signed the act into law. 76 Originally introduced on September
17, 2009 as part of the Senate's healthcare reform bill, BPCIA is the rein-
troduction of BPCIA 2007.17 BPCIA amends PHSA § 351,78 the FFDCA,
and patent law by creating a regulatory pathway for the licensing of biologi-
cal products "biosimilar to" 79 or "interchangeable with"s0 an already
approved biological product ("reference product"81). 82 Once a biological
73. See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 256 ("Biologics cost more to produce than [small-
molecule] drugs, and thus a five-year market exclusivity similar to the Hatch-Waxman
provision may not be long enough to incentivize the development of biologics.... Some have
suggested that a twelve-year market exclusivity for pioneer biologics would be optimal be-
cause traditional drugs generally have slightly under 12 years of market exclusivity due to
patent protection."); Kelly & David, supra note 3, at 139-40 ("[a] 12 to 14 year period of
innovator exclusivity is not arbitrary: studies have shown that the point at which an innovator
biological drug becomes profitable (the 'break-even' point) is between 12.9 and 16.2 years").
74. See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 256 (reviewing the flaws of patent protection for
biological products and arguing that "while traditional new [small-molecule] drugs are gener-
ally protected by patents, biologics may be less effectively protected by the patent system").
See infra Part Il I.C. I.
75. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
76. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obania Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill,
with a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010) at A19, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.htmi. As discussed earlier, less than one year later, in Feb-
ruary 2011, the same administration seems to have backed out of its earlier endorsement of
BPCIA's twelve-year exclusivity period and is currently trying to limit this exclusivity period
to seven years. See BUDGET, supra note 7, at 119.
77. BPCIA is almost identical to BPCIA 2007 introduced two years earlier by the late
Senator Edward M. Kennedy and cosponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch and former Senator Hilla-
ry Rodham Clinton. See Thomas, LiBR. OF CONG., http://thomas.gov (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
78. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006).
79. Under BPCIA, the term 'biosimilar' or 'biosimilarity' means that "the biological
product is highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in clini-
cally inactive components" and that "there are no clinically meaningful differences between
the biological product and the [original] product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of
the product." See BPCIA § 7002(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(2) (West 2012)).
80. Under BPCIA, the term 'interchangeable' or 'interchangeability' means that "the
biological product may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the
health care provider who prescribed the reference product." See BPCIA § 7002(b) (codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(3) (West 2012)).
81. Under BPCIA, the term 'reference product' means the single biological product
licensed under PHSA § 351(a) (see supra Part ILA) against which a generic biological product
is evaluated in an application submitted under BPCIA. See BPCIA § 7002(b) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 262(i)(4) (West 2012)).
82. BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 (West 2012)). BPCIA sets up
numerous elaborate conditions and requirements for the establishment of biosimilarity to or
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product is deemed "interchangeable with" a reference product, under
BPCIA it may be substituted for the reference product without the interven-
tion of the health care provider who prescribed the reference product.83
BPCIA sets a twelve-year market exclusivity period for original biolog-
ics" and a four-year data exclusivity period for the data submitted in support
of the application for the original biologic. 85 BPCIA also provides for a pos-
sible extension of the twelve-year market exclusivity and four-year data
exclusivity by an additional six-month period for having the biological
product tested and approved for use in pediatric populations.86 Thus, BPCIA
creates market exclusivity periods for original biological products of up to
interchangeability with a reference product. See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 262(k)(2)-(4)
(West 2012)).
83. See supra note 80. A determination of interchangeability is the essence of generic
legislation and the prize sought after by generic applicants. Once made, the interchangeability
determination facilitates the "interjection" of the generic product into the existing market for
the original product and enables it to benefit from the reference product's client base.
84. BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A) (West 2012)).
85. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(B) (West 2012)). Under BPCIA, during this
period, generic applicants may not submit applications for the approval of their versions of
biologics biosimilar to original biological products. For further discussion of data exclusivity,
see supra note 67.
This interpretation of the BPCIA sections relating to the exclusivities grant has been con-
tested by a group of members of the House of Representatives who are identified as
congressional supporters of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies. See Letter from Reps.
Anna Eshoo, Jay Inslee, and Joe Barton to the Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 21, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/EIB%2Ltr%20FDA%20DEC%202010.pdf [hereinafter
Eshoo letter]. The stance advanced in the Eshoo letter is that BPCIA "does not provide 'mar-
ket exclusivity' for innovator products. Rather, it provides data exclusivity for 12 years from
the date of FDA approval." Id. The Eshoo letter does not directly explain the difference be-
tween the twelve-year and four-year exclusivities established under BPCIA but indirectly
comments that "[BPCIA] does not prohibit or prevent another manufacturer from developing
its own data to justify FDA approval of a similar of [sic] competitive product." Id. The posi-
tions taken in the Eshoo letter have been criticized as opposed to public policy as well as to
the simple language of BPCIA. See, e.g., Letter from Sens. Sherrod Brown, John McCain,
Charles Schumer, and Tom Harkin to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r of the Food & Drug
Admin. (Jan. 24, 2011), available at http://brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
release/?id=eae9255a-246e-459a-826d-Obd l l7d7b9a0. Notably, as a post-enactment state-
ment, the FDA is not obliged to give the positions expressed in the Eshoo letter substantial
weight in its construction of the statutory language of BPCIA. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 530 n.27 (2007) (endorsing the position that "post-enactment legislative history is
not only oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight"). Moreover, even if one is to ig-
nore the non-conformity between the construction suggested in the Eshoo letter and the
language of BPCIA itself, the Eshoo letter's statutory construction fails to explain the differ-
ence between the twelve-year and four-year statutory exclusivities. In other words, if the
twelve-year statutory exclusivity is in fact data exclusivity, it appears to render the four-year
statutory exclusivity established by the following subsection of BPCIA redundant. According-
ly, for at least this reason, it is unlikely that the FDA will adopt the interpretation proposed in
the Eshoo letter.
86. BPCIA § 7002(g) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(m) (West 2012)).
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12.5 years and data exclusivity periods of up to 4.5 years.87 Importantly, the
statutory exclusivities established under BPCIA do not guarantee exclusivity
to an original developer of a biological product when a later developer seeks
approval for its own version of the same biological compound for the same
medical condition by conducting its own clinical trials. If the second devel-
oper independently takes its product through the FDA approval processes
without seeking to rely on the approval of the earlier "original" biological
product, it may also receive FDA approval and thus undermine the statutory
exclusivities established under BPCIA."8 BPCIA also establishes market
exclusivity periods of twelve to forty-two months for a manufacturer
of a first biological product approved as interchangeable with the
reference product."
Importantly, while the underlying rationales for market exclusivity
under BPCIA and the five-year NCE statutory exclusivity under the Hatch-
Waxman Act (on which the BPCIA market exclusivity is modeled) are similar,
their function is different. In both cases, the intention is to provide developers
of pharmaceutical products with sufficient incentives to invest in R&D.90
However, while the five-year NCE statutory exclusivity is meant to work its
effect where no incentives exist from a patent perspective (e.g., where the
drug product contains a well-known active compound that is not patenta-
ble),9 1 the 12- to 12.5-year market exclusivity under BPCIA appears to have
87. The passage of BPCIA with its 12- to 12.5-year market exclusivity and 4- to 4.5-
year data exclusivity periods is at odds with the Obama Administration's outspoken opposition
to such exclusivity periods, which it perceived as too long. See Letter from Nancy-Ann De-
Parle, Dir., Office of Health Reform and Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget to
Rep. Henry A. Waxman (June 24, 2009), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.
house.govtPressI 11/20090625/biologicsresponse.pdf (expressing the Obama Administra-
tion's position that an exclusivity period for original biological products of seven years
"strikes the appropriate balance between innovation and competition").
88. This scenario may occur when the market for the biological product is large enough
to financially justify taking the product through another, separate regulatory approval by the
FDA rather than wait for the lapse of the applicable BPCIA statutory exclusivity periods.
89. BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(6) (West 2012)). The determi-
nation of a market exclusivity period afforded to a generic manufacturer depends on several
factors, including whether a patent infringement lawsuit was filed subsequent to the filing of
the generic application for the approval of the biological product at bar, the outcome of such
lawsuit, and the marketing status of such product. Id.
90. For the idea behind the NCE exclusivity established under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
see THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTO-
RATION ACT OF 1984 60 (Allan M. Fox & Alan R. Bennett eds., 1987) ("The original Waxman
Committee version . . . would have allowed granting four years of market exclusivity only to
new chemical entities that for technical or scientific reasons are unpatentable."); 130 Cong.
Rec. 24,425 (1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman) ("the amendment provides a 5-year period of
exclusive market life for drugs approved for the first time after enactment of the legislation.
This provision will give the drug industry the incentives needed to develop new chemical
entities whose therapeutic usefulness is discovered late when little or no patent life remains").
For the idea behind the market exclusivity established under BPCIA, see supra notes 72-73
and accompanying text.
91. See Fox & Bennett, supra note 90.
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been devised as a "fallback" option to patents, serving as "insurance" in
case they fail.92
BPCIA also creates an intricate dispute resolution scheme for patent
disputes arising in relation to the submission of applications for approval of
biological products as biosimilar to or interchangeable with a reference
product.93 Under BPCIA, within twenty days from the acceptance of an ap-
plication for a generic biologic by the FDA, the generic applicant is
required, under a duty of confidentiality, to provide a copy of the application
and additional information regarding the process used to manufacture the
biological product to legal representatives of the reference product sponsor
and other potential adversaries.94 Within sixty days after receipt of the
information from the generic applicant, the reference product sponsor is
required to (1) provide the generic applicant with a list of all patents for
which the reference product sponsor believes a claim of patent infringement
could reasonably be asserted against the generic applicant if it engaged in
the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importation of the generic bio-
logical product, and (2) identify which of these patents it would be prepared
to license to the generic applicant.95 BPCIA then stipulates that within sixty
days of receipt of the reference product sponsor's patent list, the generic
applicant may (but does not have to) provide its own "counter-list" of pa-
tents with respect to which it believes a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted by the reference product sponsor.96 For each patent
on the reference product sponsor's list and the generic applicant's counter-
list, the generic applicant is required to provide either "a detailed statement
that describes, on a claim-by-claim basis, the factual and legal basis of the
opinion of the [generic] applicant that such patent is invalid, unenforceable,
or will not be infringed by the commercial marketing of the biological prod-
uct" or a statement that it does not intend to begin commercial marketing
before the date of patent expiry.97 Within sixty days of receipt of the generic
applicant's detailed statement, the reference product sponsor is required, in
92. Proponents of long market exclusivity periods in biological products have described
such exclusivity as an "insurance policy" in case patents would fail. See infra note 143 and
accompanying text. In other words, rather than provide protection in addition to patents or in
case patents cannot be obtained, market exclusivity under BPCIA is meant to provide "litiga-
tion-proof" protection to the interests of developers of biological products in case their patents
fall short.
An interesting question, which exceeds the scope of this Article, is whether statutory ex-
clusivities could be classified as proprietary rights-possibly a new kind of property-and the
implications of such classification.
93. BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l) (West 2012)).
94. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(l)-(2) (West 2012)).
95. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(3)(A) (West 2012)). BPCIA stipulates that a
reference product sponsor would be unable to sue for infringement of patents that it did not
include on its list. Id. (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e)(6) (West 2012)).
96. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(3)(B) (West 2012)).
97. Id.
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turn, to provide a "counter-detailed statement" explaining, for each patent
claim addressed in the generic applicant's detailed statement, "the factual
and legal basis of the opinion of the reference product sponsor that such
patent will be infringed by the commercial marketing of the biological prod-
uct" as well as a response to the generic applicant's statements of invalidity
and unenforceability.9 8 Upon completion of the above exchanges of
information and legal positions, BPCIA mandates that the parties must enter
pre-litigation negotiations in order to decide, within fifteen days, which pa-
tents, if any, will be the subject of an infringement action.9 9
BPCIA also addresses other potential litigation scenarios. First, BPCIA
stipulates that within thirty days of the exchange of patent lists between the
reference product sponsor and generic applicant or of the date of reaching
an agreement on patents that would be the subject of an infringement action,
the reference product sponsor is required to bring a patent infringement ac-
tion with respect to the patents under dispute.'00 Second, at least 180 days
prior to a first commercial marketing of a generic biological product,
BPCIA requires the generic applicant about to launch the product to provide
notice of the planned launch to the reference product sponsor, which may
then seek to enjoin the generic applicant from moving ahead with the
launch.' Under BPCIA, such an injunction would hold until a court deci-
sion on pending issues of patent validity, infringement, and enforceability
arising with relation to patents included on any patent list previously ex-
changed by the parties under BPCIA.102 Third, BPCIA addresses declaratory
judgment actions and mandates that if the generic applicant sent the refer-
ence product sponsor a copy of the generic product application as required,
then declaratory judgment actions would be available to the parties only
once the 180-day notice of commercial marketing is provided to the refer-
ence product sponsor. 0 3 However, the reference product sponsor may bring
such actions even earlier if the generic applicant fails to comply with other
requirements set by BPCIA.'m
The next part of this Article will compare the current legal regimes
under patent law and BPCIA as they pertain to biological products and ex-
98. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(3)(C) (West 2012)).
99. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(1)(4) (West 2012)). If the parties fail to reach an
agreement, BPCIA sets up an elaborate mechanism to decide on the number and identity of
such patents that would be the subject of such an infringement action. Id. (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(5) (West 2012)).
100. BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(6) (West 2012)). Under BPCIA,
if the reference product sponsor fails to assert certain patents within that time frame, then a
reasonable royalty is the sole and exclusive remedy that a court may grant if it finds that such
patents were infringed. Id. (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e)(6) (West 2012)).
101. BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(8) (West 2012)).
102. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(8)(B) (West 2012)).
103. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(9) (West 2012)).
104. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(9)(B)-(C) (West 2012)).
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amine the question of whether there is actually a need and justification for
both types of protection in the context of biologics.
III. PATENTS VS. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITIES IN BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS: TIMELINE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE
INTERESTS OF BIOLOGIC LICENSE HOLDERS
A. Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biologics: A Timeline
The R&D and approval of biologics, from the first synthesizing of the
biologic or a closely related compound through the approval of the BLA by
the FDA,'05 is a long process that typically spans more than a decade.'06
Although all development projects are different, a rough estimate of a typi-
cal timeline for the development of a biological product consists of about 4
to 5 years of preclinical studies, 0 7 6 to 9 years dedicated to clinical trials
prior to the submission of a BLA,os and another 12 to 16 months for the
105. One may also view the development of drugs and biologics as an ongoing process
that includes further R&D subsequent to marketing approval by the FDA. See Glossary of
Clinical Trials Terms, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Mar. 18, 2008), http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/
glossary#phaselv.
106. Grabowski 2008, supra note 5, at 481 (illustrating the length of the development
process of biologics with the example of the anti-cancer biologic Avastin, whose active com-
pound, bevacizumab, took about fifteen years to develop and have approved by the FDA);
Vernon et al., supra note 5, at 68 ("[b]ringing a single new product to market requires huge
sums of investor capital and often takes well over a decade"); see also infra Part Ill.B (dis-
cussing my finding that the average number of days between the filing of the first patent
application pertaining to a biological product, which is indicative of R&D activities, and FDA
approval of the product as pertaining to the seventy-nine biological products listed in Table I
is 3728 days, or about 10.2 years).
107. E.g., Dennis S. Fernandez et al., The Interface of Patents with the Regulatory Drug
Approval Process and How Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market Entry, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST
PRACTICES (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds, 2007) ("[plreclinical studies take an average of five
years"); DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 56, at 475 tbl.3 (estimating that the time spent on
preclinical studies of candidate biological products is about fifty-two months); Grabowski
2008, supra note 5, at 486 (stating that preclinical R&D requires four to five years to produce
several lead candidates). "Preclinical studies" are the earliest phase in drug development be-
ginning right after the identification of a candidate-compound and concluding with the filing
of an investigational new drug application (IND) with the FDA. This step normally includes in
vitro and animal testing of the tested compound, pharmacodynamic studies, and more. Fer-
nandez et al. at 966 (describing the discovery phase and preclinical studies of new drugs).
Once an IND is submitted, unless the FDA places a hold on the IND, the applicant may begin
clinical trials after thirty days. FDA Investigational New Drug Application Rule, 21 C.F.R.
§§ 312.40(b)(1), 312.42 (201 1). About 85% of all drugs for which an IND is filed are eventu-
ally approved for testing in clinical trials. Fernandez et al. at 966.
108. The clinical trials stage of development is typically divided into three phases pre-
ceding the submission of a Biologic License Application (BLA). Phase I involves testing the
candidate compound on humans for the first time for safety, determination of a dosage range, and
identification of potential side effects, and includes about twenty-eighty healthy individuals.
Phase 11 involves testing the drug/biologic on about one hundred to three hundred volunteers
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FDA to process and decide on the BLA.'" In sum, the development of a
biological product typically takes II to 15.5 years."
Based on the abovementioned time frames and in view of the fact that
statutory exclusivities in biologics only "kick in" upon FDA approval, BPCIA
dictates that (1) manufacturers of generic versions of biologics can only file
applications for generic versions of biologics fifteen to twenty years from the
inception of development of the original biological product, and (2) the FDA
may only approve such applications after twenty-three to twenty-eight years
from the inception of development of the original biologic."'
Viewing the abovementioned time frames from a patent perspective, it
is important to acknowledge several additional milestones. First, biologics
may be and often are the subject of numerous patents that typically cover (1)
specific biological compounds, namely the purified active biological com-
pounds themselves (most frequently, proteins), their precursors, possible
metabolites and other derivatives,'l 2 (2) processes of making these com-
having the condition that the drug/biologic is meant to treat to determine if it is effective and
to further evaluate its safety. Phase Ill varies greatly for different drugs/biologics but normally
involves one thousand to three thousand patients and is meant to confirm the drug/biologic's
effectiveness, monitor side effects, compare the drug to commonly used treatments, and
collect information that will allow the drug/biologic to be used safely. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.21 (2011); Understanding Clinical Trials, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Sept. 20, 2007),
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/understand#Ql8; Telephone Interview with Food & Drug
Admin. Ctr. for Biologics Eval. & Res. representative (Feb. 23, 2010) [hereinafter CBER
Interview] (on file with author). Notably, estimates of the length of the different phases of
clinical trials vary among different commentators. Phase I could take, on average, from I to 3
years; Phase II: 2 years; and Phase Ill: 3 to 4 years. Fernandez et al., supra note 107, at 966.
According to an unofficial estimate by a CBER staff-member, Phase I takes about I year on
average; Phase I1 about 2; and Phase Ill, while varying greatly depending on the amount of
testing done by the applicant, on average, about 3 years. CBER Interview. Grabowski and
DiMasi estimate that clinical trials take an average of 6.8 years. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra
note 56, at 473 fig.2 (estimating the time spent on clinical development of biologics at about
eighty-two months).
109. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 56, at 473 fig.2 (estimating the time spent on
approval of biologics at about sixteen months); CBER Interview, supra note 108.
110. This calculation is based on adding the estimated 4 to 5 years of preclinical studies,
6 to 9 years of clinical trials, and the I to 1.33 years it takes the FDA to approve BLAs, and
then rounding the result (I I to 15.33 years) to the closest half-year increment.
111. These calculations are based on adding the estimated II to 15.5 years it takes to put
a typical biologic on the market to the 4 to 4.5 years of data exclusivity and to the 12 to 12.5
years of market exclusivity under BPCIA.
112. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that naturally occurring DNA sequences constitute patentable subject matter when
"purified and isolated" as compared to their natural form); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford
Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)
(holding that the purified form of adrenalin-a compound existing in the human body-was
patentable because the purification process transformed it into drug and therefore into "a new
thing commercially and therapeutically"). But see Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pa-
tent & Trademark Office, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev'd in part. 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, matter remanded, I -725, 2012 WL 986819
(U.S. Mar. 26, 2011).
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pounds,13 (3) formulations containing the compounds,1 4 and (4) methods of
using the biological compound in the treatment of illnesses." 5 Since the
natural course of development of most biologics first involves the identifica-
tion, making, and isolation of a biologic having therapeutic properties (not
necessarily in that order), the first patent applications commonly seek to
claim the biological active pharmaceutical ingredient ("API"), closely relat-
ed compounds, and methods of making them, and are filed very early in the
development process,"'6 typically between the time immediately pursuant to
the identification of the biological API and right before the beginning of
clinical trials in human subjects."' In other words, if the beginning of the
R&D efforts is marked as the "zero" time-point and clinical trials normally
begin after four to five years of preclinical studies, then the filing of the first
patent application pertaining to the biological product would normally occur
between "development years" one and four to five (depending on the length
of the preclinical trials stage)."' Patents generally expire twenty years from
113. See Gitter, supra note 2, at 610 (reviewing the types of patents available to develop-
ers of biological products).
114. See id. Formulations are the compositions of the final product, namely the active
pharmaceutical ingredient (API) and different pharmaceutically inactive ingredients (also
known as "excipients") having certain functions in the composition, e.g., stabilization, dissolu-
tion, adjustment of pH, and filling.
115. See id.
116. Cf Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F. 3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (essential-
ly abolishing method claims directed to mechanisms of action per se, namely as standalone
claims independent from sufficient disclosure of compounds that are used to achieve the de-
sired action as part of the 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 1 written description requirement).
117. See In re 318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 583 F.3d 1317, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("results from animal tests or in vitro experiments may be sufficient to satisfy the utility re-
quirement"); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that an antitumor
compound does not necessarily have to be tested in vivo to fulfill the utility requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 101 and that in vitro tests using cell-line models may be sufficient; stating that
"[tihe stage at which an invention in [the field of biologics] becomes useful is well before it is
ready to be administered to humans"). This estimated time frame is confirmed by my findings
that the average time period between the filing of the first patent applications pertaining to
biological products and their approval by the FDA is about 3728 days, or 10.2 years. See su-
pra note 106 and accompanying text. Deducting the estimated 6 to 9 years of clinical trials
and I to 1.33 years of processing of BLAs, it appears that the time frame for filing of the first
patent applications covering biological products is about 0 to 3 years prior to the beginning of
clinical trials, cert. granted, judgment vacated, matter remanded, 11-725, 2012 WL 986819
(U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
A possible explanation of this patent filing strategy is that once a compound enters the
stage of human trials, it is exceedingly difficult to keep it as a trade secret and the early filing
is meant to preserve the developer's prospects of monopoly in any product that may result
from its R&D efforts. Another explanation is that early filing of patent applications mitigates
pressure from in-house scientists to be allowed to publish their scientifically significant find-
ings in scientific literature.
118. Notably, the first patent application is not necessarily the first submission to the
USPTO, which is frequently of a provisional application containing little more than prelimi-
nary data and a rudimentary concept of the invention and whose purpose is merely to "buy"
the inventors another year for further development of their invention prior to the filing of a
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the filing date of the original application.'"9 Thus, as a general proposition,
the primary patents 20 pertaining to biological products would be set to ex-
pire between "development years" twenty-one and twenty-five,' 2' whereas
the market exclusivity period pertaining to the products covered by these
patents would expire around "development years" twenty-three to twenty-
eight.
When comparing the term of statutory exclusivities to the term of pri-
mary patents, it is necessary to take into account patent term extensions that
one primary patent per FDA-approved product may receive under 35 U.S.C.
§ 156.122 If we make the most patent-term-favorable assumptions that virtu-
ally all first primary patents (i.e., the first primary patent to issue for any
given biological product) would merit an extension of 4 to 5 years,123 then it
is possible to argue that for any biological product there would be one patent
whose term would be extended 1.5 to 2 years beyond the expiration of the
12- to 12.5-year market exclusivity period.124 Thus, while generally the first
non-provisional application. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(b), I19(e) (2006). For further discussion of
provisional applications, see Provisional Application for Patent, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE (June 2, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/types/provapp.jsp.
119. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). This expiration date may be adjusted to compensate for
delays in the processing of the application by the USPTO, a filing of a terminal disclaimer
with respect to the issued patent, and time lost during the examination and approval of the
BLA by the FDA. See infra Part IlI.B.
120. For purposes of the discussion herein, a "primary patent" is defined as a patent
issued from one of the first patent applications to be filed early in the R&D of the biological
product and covering, typically, the biological API itself, its manufacturing, and the first
known methods of using it.
121. This calculation is based on adding the estimated one to four years from the onset
of development-which is the period during which one could assume most early patents per-
taining to a biological product would be filed-to the twenty-year patent term.
122. The term of patents pertinent to biological products "shall be extended by the time
equal to the regulatory review period for the approved product," 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006), up
to a total period of fourteen years from the date of approval of the biological product but not
exceeding five years, whereas the "regulatory review period" is calculated as half the time in
which the product was in clinical trials, plus the period it took the FDA to review and approve
the BLA. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(a)(4), (c), (f)(2)(A), (g)(1), (g)(6) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)
(2006); 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2006); see also Mossinghoff, supra note 26, at 190 (reciting and
explaining the abovementioned patent term extension provisions and stating that "[tihe patent
term restoration part . . . in title 35 of the United States Code . . . [consists of] very long, very
complicated provisions . . . . The length of the exclusivity periods are strictly arbitrary legisla-
tive numbers pulled out of the air.").
123. Given the length of clinical trials of biologics and the average 12 to 16 months
needed for FDA review of BLAs, it is prudent to assume that the majority of biological prod-
ucts would merit the maximum patent term extension of half the clinical trials' period plus the
time needed for FDA review of the application up to a maximum of 5 years. Basing the calcu-
lation on the estimated times brought herein, the term extension could be roughly estimated as
equal to half of 6 to 9 years plus I to 1.33 years, namely, 4 to 5.83 years. Given the upper limit
of 5 years, a typical patent term extension period would be 4 to 5 years.
124. Since under 35 U.S.C. § 156 patent term extension cannot extend the patent term
beyond 14 years from the date of FDA approval of the product and the statutory market exclu-
sivity under BPCIA extends for 12 to 12.5 years from that date, then, arguably, no patent term
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patents covering biological products would expire within 21 to 25 years
from the onset of development, under the above patent-term-favorable as-
sumptions, one of the primary patents would expire within about 25 to 30
years from that date.125 However, in reality not all primary patents are enti-
tled to a patent term extension, as in some instances the term of primary
patents already extends beyond 14 years from the date of FDA-approval.
Thus, as I will argue in the next section, even with patent term extension,
primary patents are expected to expire, on average, around 5 to 11 months
after the expiration of the 12- to 12.5-year market exclusivity period under
BPCIA.12 6
B. Patent Term vs. Market Exclusivity for Biologics: A Case Study
In order to test the validity of the above time frame estimates and com-
pare the term of patents pertaining to biological products with the term of
market exclusivity that such products will receive under BPCIA, I calculated
(1) the term of the first-to-issue primary patents' 27 pertaining to seventy-nine
already-approved biological products listed in Table 1128 and (2) the hypo-
thetical dates in which the market exclusivity in these products would have
expired had these products been subject to BPCIA.129 Based on these dates,
for each of the first-to-issue primary patents identified, I calculated the time
could be extended more than 2 years beyond the expiration of a 12-year market exclusivity or
1.5 years beyond the expiration of a 12.5-year market exclusivity.
125. This calculation is based on adding the estimated 4 to 5 years of patent term exten-
sion to the 21- to 25-year patent term from the inception of development. The calculation
would be slightly different if we were to add 1.5 to 2 years to the statutory exclusivity period
of 23 to 28 years, resulting in a similar patent term extending from 25 to 29.5 years from the
beginning of development.
126. See infra Part lll.B.
127. See infra Table 1, note 246, and accompanying text. The patent term calculation
was based on the various sections of patent law and includes any patent term extensions
awarded to patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act as listed in the USPTO Listing of Patent
Term Extensions under 35 U.S.C. § 156, Patent Terms Extended Under 35 USC §156, U.S.
PATENT &TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/
156.jsp, and any patent term adjustments as reflected on the face of the patents and in the
patent information available through the USPTO Patent Application Information Retrieval
System (PAIR), Patent Application Information Retrieval, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OF-
FICE, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
128. The list consists of seventy-nine biological products for which primary patents
could be identified, including sixteen out of the twenty-four best selling biological products in
2008 and excluding insulin and human growth hormone (hGH) products, for which generic (or
"follow-on") versions have already been approved by the FDA. See Top Twenty Biologics
2008, R&D PIPELINE NEWS SPECIAL EDITION 1/2009 (LaMerie Business Intelligence), Mar.
2009, at 3-6 (including Enbrel, Remicade, Epogen, Rituxan, Avastin, Herceptin, Aranesp,
Neulasta, Lantus, Avonex, Lucentis, Erbitux, Betaseron, Neupogen, Cerezyme, and Synagis).
The above selection criteria for the analyzed sample of seventy-nine biological products might
admittedly reflect selection biases. At the same time, it is difficult to determine what would be
considered a "representative sample" of biological products for the purpose of calculating the
average length of primary patent life covering such products.
129. See infra Table 1, note 247, and accompanying text.
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from expiration of the patent to the end of the twelve-year market exclusivi-
ty in the product and then, based on the results received, the average time
for the seventy-nine products between the end of the twelve-year market
exclusivity and the expiration of the primary patent.130 According to these
calculations, the average time difference between the end of the twelve-year
market exclusivity in a biological product and the expiration of the first-
issued primary patent is about 327 days.' 3 ' In other words, the average term
of the first identified primary patents pertaining to the seventy-nine biologi-
cal products listed in Table I extends about eleven months beyond the end
of the twelve-year market exclusivity period in these products. If we add
the extension of six months to the market exclusivity period (making it
12.5 years) for having a product tested and approved for pediatric use,132
the average term of the first identified primary patents pertaining to the
seventy-nine biological products listed in Table I would extend about five
months beyond the end of the market exclusivity period in these products.
In conclusion, patents in the family of the original application3 3 could
be expected to expire within roughly twenty-one to twenty-five years from
the onset of the development of the biological product 34 with one more
patent expected to expire, on average, around five to eleven months after the
period of market exclusivity under BPCIA. Thus, arguably, based on the
above calculations, the market exclusivity period under BPCIA would keep
competition out of biologic markets, on average, for five to eleven months
less than the average monopoly period afforded by primary patents on in-
ventions pertaining to the biological product.' These conclusions may be
illustrated graphically as follows:
130. See infra Table 1, note 249, and accompanying text. For purposes of the calcula-
tions herein, I refrained from making any assumptions regarding the potential addition of six
months of market exclusivity for experimentation in pediatric populations. See supra note 86
and accompanying text.
131. See infra Table 1, note 249, and accompanying text. The average number of days
between FDA approval and the expiration of the first-to-issue primary patent listed for each of
the seventy-nine products is calculated by adding the number of days for all seventy-nine
products and then dividing by seventy-nine.
132. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
133. A "patent family" includes all divisional, continuation, and continuation-in -part
applications (and issued patents thereof) stemming from a certain earlier parent application.
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(MPEP) §§ 201.04-201.08 (8th ed. 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
mpep/index.htm (referencing the latest revision from July 2010).
134. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
135. These conclusions are in accord with the rationale behind the twelve-year market
exclusivity period for new biological products under BPCIA, namely, ensuring that original
product developers are able to monopolize their products for a period at least as long as that
which patents would have afforded them. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
Importantly, these conclusions are only valid with respect to primary patents covering the
"first wave of inventions" rather than to patents covering inventions resulting from continu-
ing research.
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FIGURE 1
PATENT TERM VS. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITIES IN BIOLOGICS
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These conclusions invite the question: what is the justification (if any)
for the mostly overlapping protection of biological products under both
BPCIA and patent law'3 6 and what implications might there be to this "dou-
ble-tiered" protection?
C. Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities for
Biologics: A Public Policy Perspective
Comparing the rationales for granting statutory exclusivities with the
patent theories discussed earlier, it appears that the reasoning behind both
types of monopoly is quite similar if not identical, especially in the context
of biologics. In a nutshell, the incentive-to-disclose and incentive-to-invent
patent theories emphasize patents' functional role of incentivizing the dis-
closure of existing inventions and the pursuit of further R&D activities
leading to more inventions."'3 Taking a closer look at the rationales for
granting statutory exclusivities reveals a highly similar picture. The purpose
of statutory exclusivities in the context of pharmaceuticals is to ensure that
developers of original biologics are able to reap the fruits of their invest-
ments, thereby maintaining sufficient incentive-to-invent.138 Thus, arguably,
136. Disagreements regarding the length of patent protection are not uncommon given
the complexity of patent law and the dependence of such calculations on numerous factors
(e.g., the timing of filing of patent applications, the ramifications of various different types of
extensions, and the prosecution of the patents). However, even slight changes in the term of
any particular patent do not change the fact that the effective result of BPCIA is the institution
of "double monopoly protection" for biologics.
137. See supra Part l.A.
138. See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 255 ("[The New Chemical Entity five year market
exclusivity provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act] was meant to alleviate concerns that a generic
pathway would prohibit innovators from realizing the benefits of their investments."); Tam,
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both patent and statutory exclusivities regimes (1) recognize developers'
right to benelit from the fruit of their labor by creating means to exclude
others from using the biologics they developed;' (2) enable only the devel-
opers to reap profits from the biological products for a certain period of
time; and (3) encourage and require developers of biologics to disclose to
the public the products they develop and their uses as a pre-requisite to the
developers' ability to receive exclusivity in their products.140 Accordingly, at
least from a functional perspective, in the context of biilogics, both patents
and statutory exclusivities seek to achieve the same purpose and incentivize
essentially the same behavior by inventors, investors, and developers.
The goal of technological advancement in the area of biological prod-
ucts could therefore be served by affording any kind of effective exclusivity
guaranteeing sufficient profits to investors in R&D regardless of whether the
product of such R&D would eventually fit in the strict mold of a "patentable
invention" under patent law.141
1. Why Patents May Not Provide Sufficient Protection to
the Interests of Developers of Biological Products
The similarity of purpose and effect of statutory exclusivities and patent
protection begs the question: why, if at all, is there a need for statutory ex-
supra note 46, at 553 ("[T]he policy behind marketing exclusivities is to incentivize pharma-
ceutical research entities to engage in ambitious, cutting-edge research for the development of
new drugs and to develop greater understanding about existing drugs."); see also Grabowski
2009, supra note 5, at 2 (recognizing that both patents and statutory exclusivities "address the
need for innovators to have some period of returns before imitators can enter the market with
an abbreviated filing").
139. In the case of patents, these means to exclude take the form of letters of patent en-
forceable by courts while in the case of statutory exclusivities they entail direct exclusion of
potential competitors from the market for the particular biological product.
140. In the context of patents, disclosure takes place as part of patents' specifications. In
the context of statutory exclusivities, disclosure occurs in the submission of some publicly
available information as part of the BLA. Thus, the incentive-to-disclose rationale is inherent
to the context of biologics for the reason that it is impossible to commercialize a biologic
without prior approval by the FDA, which can only be granted subsequent to the submission
of information regarding the product, including such publicly available information about the
nature of the product and its intended medical uses. In other words, the incentive to disclose
information to the public about biologics exists regardless of any additional exclusivity that
may or may not be granted to the products' developers under patent law. Interesting questions
remain, however, as to the extent of disclosure incentivized by patent and statutory exclusivi-
ties regimes with respect to manufacturing "know-how" and actual clinical data. For further
discussion of these issues, see infra Part III.C.2.b and note 159 2 and accompanying text.
141. As early as the 1950s, the Economic Review of the Patent Systen already recog-
nized that it is "monopoly grant" in general, rather than patent monopoly in particular, that is
necessary to incentivize the risks taken by financiers of industrial application of certain tech-
nology. See EcONOMIc REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note II, at 36-37 ("The risks
involved [in investment in technological R&D] may be too great to be undertaken except un-
der the shelter of a monopoly grant."). According to this logic, statutory exclusivities would be
no different than patents from the incentive-to-invest point of view.
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clusivities in addition to patents? The most frequently cited justification is
that patents alone are insufficient to protect proprietary interests in biologi-
cal products.14 2 Viewed in this light, statutory exclusivities for biologics are
sometimes referred to as "insurance policies" meant to protect the interests
of developers of biological products where patents might fail to do so.143
There are several reasons why patents insufficiently protect the interests of
developers of biological products and why developers prefer a statutory ex-
clusivities regime such as BPCIA.
a. Patent Acquisition and Enforcement Is Expensive, Yet Patents
Provide a Limited Degree of Legal Protection for Biologics
The patent system suffers from inherent shortcomings that make the in-
vestment in obtaining and enforcing patents a risky and highly uncertain
proposition. The securing and enforcement of patent rights involves a long
and tedious via dolorosa of intricate (and expensive) proceedings. Patent
acquisition requires compliance with complicated legal criteria such as
"novelty," "utility," and "non-obviousness," as well as a plethora of procedural
and technical requirements stemming from centuries of litigation and patent
prosecution.'" This complexity, when combined with the high rate of patent
invalidation in litigation, 45 creates uncertainty regarding the outcome of pa-
tent litigation and undermines the ability of developers and entrepreneurs to
142. See infra Parts III.C.I.a-d. Representatives of original biologics developers have
made forceful assertions regarding the need for both statutory exclusivities and patent protec-
tion in biological products. See, e.g., BIO WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 22, 37 (arguing that
"[a]s was the case in the Hatch-Waxman Act, it will be important to consider patent exclusivi-
ty, along with market exclusivity provided through the regulatory approval mechanism, as an
integral part of the follow-on biologic approval framework;' and that "any statutory pathway
for the approval of follow-on biologics must contain an appropriate mix of patent-based and
market/data-based exclusivity to ensure effective market protection to incentivize investment
and innovation").
143. According to Grabowski and DiMasi, the purpose of statutory exclusivities is to
provide investors "with an 'insurance policy' against the potential failings of patent protection
for biologics." BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY POSITION PAPER, supra note 5, at 4 ("[A] 14-year
period of data exclusivity serves essentially as an insurance policy that provides the innovator
with some certainty of protection."); Grabowski et al., supra note 5, at 4; Grabowski & Di-
Masi 2009, supra note 5, at 8 ("[fjrom the standpoint of innovative firms, [statutory]
exclusivity protection provides a back-up or insurance policy to the patent system").
144. See EcoNoMic REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 6 ("[Blut just what
an 'invention' is, and when it can be regarded as 'novel' and 'useful,' is not self evident. The
questions of the 'correct' criteria of utility, novelty, and invention have been answered in many
different ways, and the courts of several countries are constantly reconsidering earlier an-
swers."). For a good example of the intricacy of patent prosecution proceedings one need only
consider the volume of the USPTO's Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), see
USPTO, supra note 133.
145. See Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in
the U.S. Patent System: A Proposalfor Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) ("Near-
ly half of litigated patents are invalidated.").
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rely on patents as a dependable means of securing their investment.14 6
Machlup described the shortcomings of patents as follows:
The patent system lacks logic. It postulates something called 'in-
vention' but in fact no satisfactory definition of "invention" has
even appeared, and the courts, in their search for guiding rules, have
produced an almost incredible tangle of conflicting doctrines. This
confusion has led to extensive and costly litigation. Its critics have
described the patent right as merely "something which has to be de-
fended in the courts" and, because it may put the individual
inventor at a disadvantage against the larger corporations, as "a lot-
tery in which it is hardly worthwhile taking out a ticket." The
system, too, is wasteful. It gives protection for 16 years (or therea-
bouts) whilst in fact over nine-tenths of the patents do not remain
active for the whole of this period ... It is almost impossible to
conceive of any existing social institution so faulty in so many ways.
It survives only because there seems to be nothing better'47
All of these shortcomings of the patent system appear to be further ex-
acerbated in the context of pharmaceuticals in general and biologics in
particular.'48 First, as I will later argue, due to some particular characteris-
tics, biologics are subject to especially high barriers to patentability not
existing in other areas of technology.' 49
Second, the patent dispute resolution framework established by BPCIA
would necessitate an even higher investment of resources by all of the par-
ties involved.' As discussed earlier, BPCIA sets up a highly complicated
146. See Grabowski 2008, supra note 5, at 482 (warning that "if the relatively few large
success[ful biological products that make it through development and approval] experience
increased uncertainty due to patent challenges and the potential for early entry of generic
versions, higher risk-adjusted rates of return will be demanded by venture capital firms as
well as in initial public offerings and secondary offerings in public markets, yielding fewer
candidates that meet this standard"); Grabowski & DiMasi 2009, supra note 5, at 9 ("Un-
certainty about recoupment periods and the ability to earn a risk adjusted return on
particular new product candidates will result in fewer of these candidates being taken for-
ward into development.").
147. EcoNoMic REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 44 (emphasis added).
Despite the fact that the Economic Review of the Patent System made these statements over
fifty years ago-before the patent term was adjusted to twenty years from the date of filing
and prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit-it appears that much of what the Economic
Review of the Patent System described in 1958 remains true today in the context of biologics.
148. See Grabowski 2008, supra note 5, at 4 ("[T]here is a much higher probability now
than there was a decade ago that drugs will experience patent challenges and that they will
occur much sooner after brand launch."); Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 2 ("Patents may
provide less clear and less predictable intellectual property protection for biologics than for
small molecule drugs.").
149. See infra Part Ill.C.I.b.; see also BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY POSITION PAPER, supra
note 5, at 2-3 (arguing that patent law yields increasingly narrow patent claims to biologics).
150. See Laura A. Coruzzi, Jonathan A. Muenkel & Lynda Q. Nguyen, The Crusade for
Follow-On Biologics: The Next Wave of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation?, 2 LANDSLIDE 30,
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and elaborate framework for the resolution of patent disputes arising out of
the filing of an application for biosimilar products.' 5 ' This framework re-
quires potential adversaries to obtain extensive legal counselingl 52 and,
possibly, litigate numerous patent disputes in several different legal proceed-
ings over a prolonged period of time.15 3 Furthermore, protecting a single
biological product normally involves more than one patent, so it is prudent to
assume that patent disputes arising in the context of biologics would not only
entail several legal proceedings over a prolonged period of time, but would
also involve several patents directed to different types of inventions.15 4
Finally, the scope afforded to patents pertaining to biologics by courts is
even more unpredictable than that of patents generally because of the uncer-
tainty surrounding the application of the doctrine of equivalents to this
relatively new area of technology.'5 5 Combining all of the above with the
31 (2009) (predicting that the passage of a framework for the approval of generic versions for
biological products may "result in an influx of patent litigation in the field of biology").
151. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
152. BPCIA dictates that the parties involved in the patent dispute partake in an ex-
change of patent lists and statements of their respective legal positions, to be followed by
negotiations aimed at the resolution of possible patent disputes prior to and in lieu of resorting
to any legal action in court. See BPCIA § 7002(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k) (West
2012)). Given these proceedings' robustness, the necessary involvement of attorneys is likely
to come at a substantial cost.
153. The framework set up in BPCIA accounts for the possibility that patent disputes
under BPCIA may involve several different legal proceedings spanning over the course of
eight years or more, beginning with the expiration of the data exclusivity period-four years
after the approval of the original product-and ending with the conclusion of actions for de-
claratory judgment or injunction prompted by an advance notice of intent to market a
biosimilar product given 180 days prior to the onset of marketing. See id. (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 262(k)(6)-(9) (West 2012)). The existence of patents covering biological products
would automatically trigger the BPCIA patent dispute resolution proceedings even if the pa-
tents are set to expire prior to the end of the market exclusivity period.
154. See Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 2-3 ("Biologics rely on multiple patents,
including narrower product patents and process patents."); see also supra notes 112-115 and
accompanying text. More patents represent a larger investment in prosecution and enforce-
ment as well as increased uncertainty regarding the scope of the protected rights and the
degree and extent of their enforceability.
155. The doctrine of equivalents is a patent law construct meant to encompass within the
scope of patent claims subject matter which does not squarely fall under the literal meaning of
the claim but is nonetheless equivalent to the patented invention. The most common legal
standard for equivalence is the "function-way-result" test according to which a product or
process is deemed an equivalent where "the accused product or process performs substantially
the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result, as
disclosed in the claim." See Abbott Labs. & Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d
1282, 1296-97 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Equivalency may also be proven where the differences be-
tween the invention as claimed and the accused product or process are insubstantial."). Thus,
for example, even if a generic biological API would not literally infringe the relevant com-
pound claim, it could trigger an issue of equivalents if the two compounds would have
substantially the same structure enabling them to achieve substantially the same result in substan-
tially the same way or are otherwise only different in an insubstantial way. According to the
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), "[bliotechnology is considered an unpredictable
field because it is often not known how even a minor change may affect the structure, behavior
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already increased likelihood of patent challenges in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor in recent years,'5 6 the prospect of utilizing patents to protect proprietary
interests of developers of biological products appears to be far from attrac-
tive. This may, in turn, result in a curbing of R&D investment.'"
Interestingly, these shortcomings of the patent system are "comple-
mented" with claims that, at least in the context of biologics, patents do not
serve their role as facilitators of disclosure of valuable information to the
public.' Biotechnology patents have been accused of not providing suffi-
cient disclosure to benefit the public and of revealing only piecemeal
portions of certain technologies, which are useless in and of themselves and
which could only serve as part of larger mechanisms to which the public is
not made privy.159
and biological activity of a protein." BIO WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 28. Thus, if even a
seemingly minor change to a biological compound may drastically affect its structure, the way
it functions, or its biological result, then it is possible to say that such minor changes in a bio-
logical compound would affect the "function-way-result" aspects of such compound in a "not
insubstantial way," which in turn would render the scope of equivalents in such a compound
highly unpredictable. Accordingly, as recognized in the BIO White Paper, "there is no certain-
ty that an innovator can obtain adequate patent protection covering variant proteins." BIO
WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 28; see also Natasha L. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in
Biopharntaceutical Patents, I I B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 55-57, 66-72 (2005) (arguing that
"[tihe application of the doctrine of equivalents in the realm of gene and protein patents,
which appear to be the foundation of new medical breakthroughs, is highly significant ....
[tihus there is debate over its applicability" and there are calls for limiting the applicability of
the doctrine of equivalents in such patents). Notably, one way to address this difficulty that is
often used in claims directed to biological subject matter is to claim compositions that are "at
least XX% identical" to the sequence recited by the claim. This, of course, could give rise to
similar difficulties to the ones encountered under the doctrine of equivalents, only this time in
the context of claim construction.
156. See Grabowski & DiMasi 2009, supra note 5, at 19 ("[T]he trend in recent years
has been for patent challenges to become much more frequent.").
157. See 2008 CRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26 ("[Sleveral experts maintain that de-
fending patents may divert support from on-going innovation, especially in small companies
that make up a significant portion of the biotechnology sector.").
158. See supra Part I.A. I.
159. See, e.g., Sorscher, supra note 58, at 304 ("[Tlhe patent for [biologics] may only cover
early versions of the product produced in the laboratory setting, not the master cell lines and
scaled-up industrial process used to produce the product eventually tested on patients and
approved by the FDA. Firms can and do seek trade secret protection on these cell lines and
processes, forcing follow-on manufacturers to start over after a long and expensive design
process.").
Arguably, the statutory exclusivities established under BPCIA do not do a better job of
facilitating disclosure of meaningful or practical information to the public since the actual
clinical data and manufacturing know-how submitted as part of the original BLA is considered
proprietary and therefore not accessible to the public. See generally Dinh, supra note 3, at
102-103 (arguing that drug developers have no property interest in the public fact that a cer-
tain drug was found to be safe and efficacious enough to be approved for marketing and
because such reliance does not involve an actual disclosure of clinical data submitted by drug
developers); John C. Yoo, Takings Issues in the Approval of Generic Biologics, 60 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 33, 43 (2005) ("If FDA decided to use the knowledge acquired by a pioneer com-
pany in furtherance of a subsequent approval of a generic biologic drug, the agency likely
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FDA-granted statutory exclusivities, on the other hand, are obtained and
enforced automatically as a by-product of the FDA approval proceedings,'60
and their practice does not require their beneficiary to take any specific ac-
tion.'6 ' They also do not lend themselves to the skirmishes that characterize
patent infringement disputes.162 Thus, statutory exclusivities negate the need
for long, cumbersome, expensive, and uncertain proceedings such as those
characterizing patent prosecution and enforcement, which makes statutory
exclusivities highly appealing as the means of protecting one's investment in
technology. 163 Statutory exclusivities provide a relatively predictable
would encounter no significant taking issue."); Andrew Wasson, Note, Taking Biologics for
Granted? Takings, Trade Secrets, and Off-Patent Biological Products, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH.
REv., 0004, 130, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/2005ditr
0004.html (arguing that "it is unlikely that the approval of off-patent biologics originally ap-
proved under the [F]FDCA would be a taking"); Letter from Prof. John C. Yoo, Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley, Sch. of Law, to the Food & Drug Admin., Div. of Dockets Mgmt. (Oct. 21, 2004),
available at http://www.gphaonline.com/sites/default/files/UC-Berkeley%20Professor%20
Yoo's%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Takings%20CIause.pdf (addressing the constitutionality
of the FDA's reliance on safety and efficacy conclusions reached in approval proceedings of
original biological products for the approval of generic versions of such products and deter-
mining that it is not a taking of such (admittedly) proprietary information under the Fifth
Amendment). Some commentators have argued that the FDA should make full disclosure to
the public of safety and efficacy data relied on as part of approval proceedings of new pharma-
ceuticals. See e.g., Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public
Access to Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 Miss. L.J. 705, 712, 752-54, 762-67 (2009) (making
a compelling argument in favor of "comprehensive disclosure of meaningful clinical trial data
from all studies, regardless of whether FDA approval is obtained or even sought").
160. As discussed earlier, statutory exclusivities are conferred "automatically" on recipi-
ents of FDA marketing approvals and thus, securing them requires no direct additional
investment on the part of developers of biologics. Putting a biologic through all the tests and
clinical trials necessary for approval by the FDA is an essential and unavoidable part of its
approval for marketing. Therefore, the investment involved in obtaining FDA approval for
biological products should be viewed as sunk costs, i.e., as a necessary expenditure that has to
be invested regardless of the legal protection sought for the investment. Hence, the direct in-
vestment in obtaining a statutory exclusivity could be viewed as zero while obtaining and
securing patents in related inventions would presumably involve additional costs. Similarly,
the enforcement of patents would require the developers of original biologics to invest signifi-
cantly in bringing lawsuits against infringers. As for statutory exclusivities, it is the FDA that
bears the costs of litigating possible challenges of its decisions not to approve additional prod-
ucts and not the developers of the original products.
161. Under BPCIA, potential competitors are barred from even attempting to enter the
market while the statutory exclusivities are in place because the FDA is unable to accept for
evaluation any application for a follow-on biological product prior to the expiration of the data
exclusivity period or approve such applications prior to the expiration of the market exclusivi-
ty period. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
162. As discussed earlier, statutory exclusivities are significantly less vulnerable to legal
challenges than patents. See supra Part LB; see also BRILL, supra note 5, at 6 ("Patents can, and
frequently are, subject to legal challenge and therefore contain some amount of uncertainty for
the patent holder. Data exclusivity is not challengeable in court and therefore is not uncertain.").
163. See BRILL, supra note 5, at 6. The application of statutory exclusivities is not af-
fected by the inherent uncertainty accompanying patent law, especially with regard to such
matters as the application of the doctrine of equivalents, meeting of burdens of proof, "battles
of experts," inequitable conduct, and more.
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outcome in case of potential disputes, which, in turn, represents not only
significant cost savings but also minimization of investors' risks, thereby
creating a business environment favorable to investment in R&D."
b. The 'Product of Nature' Doctrine and the Insufficiency
of Patents as Means of Promoting Basic Research
and Development in Biology and Biomedicine
There are various types of bioiogics for which patentability is limited
and yet for which R&D is highly desirable from a public policy perspec-
tive.' In many of these instances, the impediment to patentability is the
'product of nature' doctrine according to which patents may only be
granted for "nonnaturally occurring [articles of] manufacture or composi-
tion[s] of matter" that are "product[s] of human ingenuity." 66 In other
cases, the obstacles may be the heightened standards of written description
and enablement,16 1 utility,'68 and other issues specific to the field of bio-
164. In this respect, the legal certainty accompanying a regime of statutory exclusivities
has a clear advantage over patents from an incentive-to-invent/invest public policy perspective.
165. For example, genes, naturally occurring nucleic acid sequences (DNA and RNA)
that have not been fully sequenced, non-purified naturally occurring compositions containing
antibodies, naturally occurring proteins and hormones, and so forth. See Kelleher, supra note
57, at 256 ("[Tjhe patentability of some biological materials is extremely narrow due to strin-
gent specification and enablement requirements.").
166. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). According to the
Chakrabarty Court, "[t]he laws of nature [and] physical phenomena ... have been held not
patentable.. . . Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is
not patentable subject matter.... Such discoveries are 'manifestations of ... nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.' Id. at 309 (citations omitted). The 'product of nature'
doctrine bears particular relevance to the context of biologics because so many biological
products are in fact naturally occurring molecules, e.g., human growth hormone, insulin, and
crythropoictin. See 2008 CRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (addressing the implications of the
'product of nature' doctrine on biologics).
167. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("An adequate writ-
ten description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention
and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the
DNA itself."); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (requiring making a
deposit of microorganisms to a publicly available depository as part of meeting the written
description and enablement requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph); BIO WHITE
PAPER, supra note 2, at 30-32 (arguing that biotechnology is subject to "strict written descrip-
tion and enablement" requirements); Aljalian, supra note 155, at 28-30 (arguing that
"biotechnology has come to have greater written description and enablement requirements,
and patents in this field have been required to strictly comply with these requirements"); Tam,
supra note 46, at 544-47 (reviewing issues pertaining to enablement of biological inventions
and arguing that many patents pertaining to biologics may be invalid for lack of enablement).
See generally Karen G. Potter, Getting Written Description Right in the Biotechnology Arts: A
Realist Approach to Patent Scope, 28 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 1, 17 (2009) (describing the
uncertainty surrounding the law of written description in biotechnological patents).
168. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL30648, AN EXAMINATION OF
THE ISSUES SURROUNDING BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTING AND ITS EFFECT UPON ENTREPRE-
NEURIAL COMPANIES, at 18-26 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 CRS REPORT] (addressing the
application of the utility requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to biotechnologies).
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technology.169 As a result, there is ongoing concern that such impediments to
patentability might hinder highly desirable R&D of some types of biologics
by making them insufficiently attractive to potential investors. 7 0
Various solutions have been proposed over the years to ease the tension
between the need to encourage "basic research" (i.e., research that is aimed
at the discovery and understanding of natural phenomena) and patentabil-
ity.' 7 ' However, these solutions have usually been partial at best and, thus
far, have failed to bring a conclusion to the debate over the patentability of
specific types of biologics.17 2
Contrary to the seemingly arbitrary and stringent requirements for ob-
taining a patent in the context of biologics, the statutory exclusivities regime
set up by BPCIA does not give rise to similar impediments. Rather, it facili-
tates granting statutory exclusivities independent of external criteria such as
"patentability" and depends only on the FDA's finding of biological products
as sufficiently safe and effective. 3 Thus, the statutory exclusivities regime
established by BPCIA incentivizes any kind of R&D project that may eventu-
ally lead to biological products regardless of its patentability, including
169. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("[W]hen an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as to distin-
guish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining it, conception has not been
achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.").
See also 2000 CRS REPORT, supra note 168, at 11-18 (addressing potential obstacles to pa-
tentability due to what the author describes as "ethical concerns"); Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'g denied
(Sept. 13, 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2011) cert. granted, judgment vacated, matter re-
manded, 11 -725, 2012 WL 986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012) (holding that composition of isolated
DNA sequences associated with cancer were patent-eligible subject matter but that methods
for comparing or analyzing isolated DNA sequences associated with predisposition to cancer
were not patentable).
170. One such type of research involves the identification of particular genes and naturally
occurring mutations in the human genome. Among the most prominent types of genetic diseases
whose exact genetic background remains unknown at this time are asthma, various types of can-
cer, and epilepsy. See Cancer Genetics Overview, NAT'L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/pdq/genetics/overview/HealthProfessional/page2 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012) ("[the]
expanding knowledge [of cancer genetics] has implications for all aspects of cancer manage-
ment, including prevention, screening, and treatment"); NINDS Epilepsy Information Page,
NAT'L INST. OF NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKES, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/
disorders/epilepsy/epilepsy.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012) ("Researchers are working to identi-
fy genes that may influence epilepsy."); What Causes Asthma?, NIH HEART, LUNG & BLOOD
INsT. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/asthma/causes.html
("Researchers think some genetic and environmental factors interact to cause asthma.").
171. For example, courts have created an exception for naturally occurring compounds if
such compounds are "purified and isolated." See supra note 112.
172. A recent example of an ongoing ambiguity of the patentability of biologics is the
continuing debate regarding the patentability of naturally occurring DNA sequences (e.g.,
genes) and variations thereof (e.g., cDNA or diagnostic products thereof). See Ass'n for Mo-
lecular Pathology, supra note 169.
173. See discussion infra Part III.C.l.a.
Spring 2012] 457
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
research that may lead to the discovery of naturally occurring or non-
isolated biological compounds.17 4
c. Patents Provide Insufficient Protection to Biological
APIs and the Processes of Making Them
In some situations, patent compound claims"' and claims directed to
methods of making them might prove ineffective in protecting particular
biological compounds.7 6 As explained earlier, biological compounds are
highly complex molecules and are often made of hundreds, sometimes thou-
sands, of building blocks arranged in intricate three-dimensional structures."'
Thus, biological compounds and the processes of making them normally lend
themselves to an enormous number of potential variations, which could be
used for "designing-around" patent claim limitations in order to yield highly
similar compounds or highly similar processes of making them.17 8
174. A notable exception to the broad applicability of statutory exclusivities and their
potential as means of incentivizing R&D in biomedical technology exists in relation to the
development of means of diagnosing certain diseases, including by using identified DNA and
RNA sequences. For the reasons mentioned above, newly identified genes are currently held
unpatentable. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. However, they also seem to not fall
under the definition of biologics under PHSA § 351(i). See supra note 2 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, genetic diagnostics have an important role in the prevention and treatment
of certain diseases and genetic predispositions that could not have otherwise been detected.
For example, the tests for the presence of mutations in the BRCAI and BRCA2 genes associ-
ated with increased risk of developing breast and ovarian cancers, while not serving as means
of preventing such cancers per se, assist in recognizing the need for medical surveillance and
preventive treatment for individuals having these mutations. See BRCAl and BRCA2: Cancer
Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT'L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/
Risk/BRCA (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). Thus, it is desirable to grant some form of statutory
exclusivities-even if shorter than those afforded by BPCIA-in genetic diagnostics so as to
incentivize research leading to the development of such diagnostics. See Gregory Dolin, Ex-
clusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2020112.
175. Compound claims are patent claims drafted specifically to cover a particular chemi-
cal or biological compound or a group of particular compounds defined by structure, function,
or characteristics (e.g., melting point, X-ray diffraction pattern, solubility, density).
176. See Grabowski et al., supra note 5, at 4 ("Patent protection alone may be insuffi-
cient for biologics in the context of biosimilars."); Kelleher, supra note 57, at 256 ("The
complexity of most biologics may allow a biogeneric manufacturer to design around an
innovator's patents, but still secure regulatory approval through its 'biosimilarity' to the
pioneer biologic.").
177. See supra note 2.
178. See BIO DATA ExcLusIvITY POSITION PAPER, supra note 5, at I (discussing why
biologics are susceptible to "design-arounds" and negative consequences thereof); JiM
HOLLINGSHEAD & ROB JACOBY, AVOIDING No MAN'S LAND: POTENTIAL UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 16 (2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/
assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/uslshc-avoiding%20no%20man's%20]an
d_-FOB_033009(l).pdf ("[M]any industry participants are concerned that innovators' patents
will prove relatively easy to circumvent. The very size of these molecules opens the possibility
that a very small change to the molecule that preserves the core design ... could circumvent
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Moreover, for the reasons discussed earlier, the doctrine of equivalents
might not provide effective means for encompassing "design-arounds" with-
in the scope of the relevant claims.'7 9 Given the innumerable possibilities of
"design-arounds" that exist for many biological compounds and the general
unpredictability of the results of even minor changes to biological com-
pounds, the application of the doctrine of equivalents to biotechnological
inventions might prove extremely difficult. 80 Even if we assume that the
changes to the biological compound do not substantially affect the way it
achieves a "substantially same" result, there would still remain the difficult
question: what is "substantial structural similarity" in biologics for equiva-
lence purposes? Apparently, the likelihood of establishing infringement of a
biological compound claim under the doctrine of equivalents (at least at
this point in time) is low at best, which under some circumstances may
make it easy for generic manufacturers to enter the market with their "bio-
similar" versions of approved biological compounds before developers of
the IP of the innovator company without technically infringing on its patent. Similarly, it is
theoretically possible that [a generic manufacturer] could create a nearly identical molecule
through a different process, and again be deemed technically to not be in violation of
patents."); Gitter, supra note 2, at 612 (explaining that generic versions of biologics "might be
sufficiently similar to the innovator biologic to rely on the FDA's findings of safety and
effectiveness for the innovator product, but at the same time prove different enough from the
innovator product to avoid a patent infringement claim").
179. In view of the size of some proteins, it is quite possible that generic manufacturers
could develop proteins that would be substantially structurally different from the original
biological compound and yet have biological activity identical or highly similar to that of the
original compound and therefore fall under the definition of "biosimilar" under BPCIA. See
supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 2-3 ("Bio-
logics rely on multiple patents, including narrower product patents and process patents that
may be more vulnerable to inventing around than small molecule product patents.. . . [Ilt is
possible that biosimilars may be different enough not to infringe on patents, but similar
enough to qualify for an abbreviated approval pathway."); Potter, supra note 167, at 14-15
("In practice, the Courts are reluctant to apply [the doctrine of equivalents] in biotechnolo-
gy cases .... It is far from certain how much variation in a protein a court would deem to
be an "insubstantial" change. In sum, the [doctrine of equivalents] is so restrictive as to 'evis-
cerate the applicability and potency of the [doctrine of equivalents] in almost all imaginable
situations."').
180. See BIO WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 30 (explaining that two structurally differ-
ent proteins could be biologically equivalent and still there would be no patent infringement);
Marr, supra note 57, at DI ("Because biosimilars aren't exact duplicates of the original drugs,
they don't violate the original drug's patent, enabling legal distribution before patent expira-
tion."); Vernon et al., supra note 5, at 69 (arguing that it would be easy to "design around"
biological products and that "[tihis artifact of intellectual property rights law places a greater
emphasis on [statutory] exclusivity provisions for biologic products"). But see FTC REPORT,
supra note 5, at vi ("There is no evidence that patents claiming the compound or molecule of
pioneer biologic drugs have been designed around more frequently than those claiming small-
molecule drug products."); Potter, supra note 167, at 1, 14-15 (describing a hypothetical case
in which strict written description requirements make a patentee narrowly claim its invention
thereby "inviting" imitations that do not fall within the scope of the invention as claimed).
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original biologics had a chance to reap the profits that would make their
efforts worthwhile.' 8'
The statutory exclusivities framework established under BPCIA does
not give rise to such potential uncertainties and eliminates the need to liti-
gate altogether. The BPCIA statutory exclusivities framework institutes a
clear choice: if one wishes to rely on a previous FDA approval of a certain
biological product without having to invest the vast amounts of money nec-
essary in order to obtain independent approval of one's own product, one
must wait until the expiration of the relevant statutory exclusivity periods.182
Under a statutory exclusivities regime, a generic manufacturer need only
seek to obtain approval for its product to trigger the statutory exclusivity bar
forbidding the FDA to approve the application regardless of whether or not
the biological compounds are similar enough to be used interchangeably and
the degree of their similarity.
d. Patents Provide Poor Protection to
Biologics Manufacturing Know-How
For many biologics, one of the most difficult and important aspects of
bringing the product to the market is the development of manufacturing
know-how.'83 However, for various reasons, know-how is especially difficult
to protect under patent law. First, viewed through a patent-law prism, the
majority of manufacturing techniques are "well known in the art."'84 Thus,
the manufacturing recipes of most biological products could, arguably, be
developed through 'routine experimentation' and would therefore be obvi-
ous under 35 U.S.C. § 103.185 Second, as explained earlier, patent claims
181. Cf Amgen v. Hoechst, 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 132-35 (D. Mass. 2001), rev'd 457 F.3d
1293, 1308-12 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that a patent claim for a 164 amino-acid erythropoiet-
in was infringed under the doctrine of equivalents where the allegedly infringing molecule had
only one more amino acid on the C terminus and achieved substantially the same clinical
result in the same way and holding that there was no prosecution history estoppel).
182. Notably, the possibility of approval of two parallel, potentially identical APIs for
treatment of the same medical condition raises the separate issue of inefficiencies involved in
parallel development of pharmaceutical products. A possible way of avoiding the waste of
resources associated with such situations-at least those resulting from the respective devel-
opers' unawareness of the competing project-would be to have the FDA publish preliminary
details regarding INDs it receives.
183. See BIO WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining some of the difficulties in-
volved in the manufacturing of biological compounds and their susceptibility to changes in
manufacturing processes).
184. In other words, "well known" to persons of ordinary skill in the pertinent forms of
art, such as molecular biology or biochemistry.
185. See Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Among
the inventions that the law deems obvious are those modest, routine, everyday, incremental
improvements of an existing product or process that confer commercial value ... but do not
involve sufficient inventiveness to merit patent protection. This class of inventions is well
illustrated by efforts at routine experimentation [where] ... method[s] of creation are well
known, making successful results of the experimentation predictable.").
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covering manufacturing processes could, and often are, "designed-around,"
namely, evaded by making the same products in a different way, thereby
rendering them irrelevant to protecting the substantial investment involved
in the development of manufacturing know-how.'86
A grant of statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, on the other hand, does
not require disclosure of manufacturing know-how to third parties (e.g., ge-
neric manufacturers).'18 Similarly, third parties are not able to circumvent
statutory exclusivities under BPCIA by "designing around" the protected
products (at least not if the applicant wishes to rely on the original product
for approval of its own generic version thereof).'
2. Why Concurrent Patent and Statutory Exclusivities Protection in
Biological Products Might Have Undesirable Ramifications
In view of the above, it is not surprising that developers of biological
products advocated vehemently in favor of long statutory exclusivity periods
for original biological products.'89 However, even though the literature is
replete with arguments in favor of making statutory exclusivities available to
biological product developers in addition to patents,19 0 I am not aware of
similar arguments having been made regarding a supposed need for patent
protection in addition to and concurrent with the term of statutory exclusivi-
ties such as those provided under BPCIA; nor am I aware of any
justification for affording such protection.' 9 ' In other words, no one seems to
argue that statutory exclusivities, while they last, provide insufficient protec-
tion to the interests of developers of biological products such that they
should be supplemented by patent protection. Rather, it appears that
affording protection under both patent and statutory exclusivities regimes
while both of them are in effect is likely to have undesirable ramifications.
186. See Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 2-3; supra text accompanying note 181; see
also BIO WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 32 ("It is rare that a patented process of chemical
synthesis will be able to block any and all means of producing the product.").
187. See supra note 159, 12.
188. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 3 (listing the advantages of statutory exclu-
sivities and how they remedy the shortcomings of patents in the context of biologics).
Arguably, the most straightforward way of addressing the inadequacy of the patent sys-
tem for protecting biotechnological inventions would be to "fix" the patent system itself,
namely by tailoring specific solutions that would encompass the type of product of biotechno-
logical research and development activities that policy makers seek to incentivize within the
scope of what patent law would deem patentable subject matter. However, this route would
not be preferable to statutory exclusivities because such highly specific biotechnology-
oriented solutions might even further increase the transaction costs involved in obtaining and
enforcing biotechnology patents.
190. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 5.
191. As explained earlier, statutory exclusivities negate the need for patent protection at
least for the underlying compounds comprising biological products, the methods of making
them, and the initially approved methods of using them.
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a. Concurrent Protection by Both Patents and Statutory
Exclusivities Leads to a Waste of Societal Resources
The enforcement of patents is an expensive prospect not only for the in-
dividual parties involved but also for society at large. Patent systems require
substantial investment in education and training necessary to administer pa-
tent prosecution and litigation.' 92 Moreover, maintaining a patent system
with all its numerous elements, including a patent office, the various tribu-
nals partaking in the administration and enforcement of patent law,193 and
highly trained personnel,194 requires a significant ongoing investment of so-
cietal resources."' Thus, the investment of resources in the enforcement of
patent rights where statutory exclusivities already cover biological products
constitutes a waste of the relative portion of societal resources that is neces-
sary to facilitate such enforcement.196
b. Concurrent Protection by Both Patents and Statutory
Exclusivities Gives Rise to Unnecessary
and Avoidable Risks of Abuse
Monopoly creates an inherent risk of abuse.' 97 Thus, affording patent
protection for biological products in parallel to FDA-instituted exclusivities
increases the risk of abuse by developers of biological products in a variety
of ways and disserves the public interest that both regimes were created to
promote.' 98 Such abuse might result in an anti-competitive impact on incen-
192. Hypothetically, had these resources not been invested in this manner, they could
have been invested in other equally or possibly more socially beneficial avenues.
193. For example, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB; formerly known as the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences), International Trade Commission, and
federal courts.
194. For example, judges, administrative law judges, patent examiners, and all their
professional and administrative staff.
195. Notably, the administration of the patent dispute resolution scheme established in
BPCIA requires even further investment of societal resources such as those described herein.
See further discussion of the BPCIA patent dispute resolution scheme supra Part Ill.C. .a.
196. To clarify, the argument here is not that the entire societal investment of resources
in the creation and maintenance of a patent system constitutes waste, but rather that the rela-
tive portion of such an investment which is necessary to support the handling of patent
disputes as they pertain to biological products which are being covered by statutory exclusivi-
ties under BPCIA is wasteful.
197. The Economic Review of Patent System defines "abuse" as a situation where "the
social objectives which [the monopoly] is supposed to serve are not promoted but rather jeop-
ardized by the way it is used[,].... when the temporal, functional, or material limits of the
monopoly intended by the [monopoly] grant are overstepped and the actually achieved mo-
nopolistic control is extended in time, in scope or in strength." See ECONoMIC REVIEW OF
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 10.
198. For example, numerous commentators have expressed concerns regarding patent
abuse practices commonly referred to as "evergreening." See, e.g., Laurence J. Kotlikoff,
Clearing the Way to Low-Cost Biogenerics, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 26, 2008),
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial-opinion/oped/articles/2008/10/26/clearing-the-
way-forlow-cost_biogenerics (warning against granting developers of original biologics
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tives to invest in biologics' R&D, which would, almost inevitably, diminish
public access to biological products.'99
BPCIA accounts for the risk of abuse of statutory exclusivities by spe-
cifically and explicitly disallowing grants of market and data exclusivities
under certain circumstances. First, BPCIA stipulates that applications for
the approval of biologics that are "supplements" to an original BLA cannot
re-trigger the market and data exclusivity provisions.20 Second, BPCIA de-
termines that applications filed by the same manufacturer or its "licensor,
predecessor in interest, or other related entity" do not merit data or market
exclusivity if the application is merely for a "modification to the structure of
the biological product that does not result in a change in safety, purity, or
potency."20' Finally, under BPCIA, an application filed by the same manu-
facturer for a non-structural change of the biologic and "that results in a new
indication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery
system, delivery device, or strength" does not award the manufacturer with
an exclusivity period on top of that already awarded for the original biologi-
cal product.202
twelve to fourteen years of statutory exclusivity alongside with patent protection and arguing
that such protection would increase the risk that developers of original biologics would at-
tempt to evergreen their biological products). According to Kotlikoff, evergreening is
"mak[ing] relatively minor changes to existing products in order to restart their monopoly
protection clocks. These changes include changing the medication strength of pills[,] ...
changing the form of medication (e.g., switching from pill to capsule), modifying the method
of delivery (e.g., from injection to inhalation), expanding indications (applying the medicine
to additional conditions), pegylation (which has the effect of reducing doses per time period
via time-release mechanisms), and glycosolation [sic] (adding sugar molecules to the medica-
tion)." KOTLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 9. See also BRILL, supra note 5, at 7 ("[e]vergreening is a
process whereby the holder of the patents for a biologic drug, using incremental changes to its
original product, is able to shift the market to a newer product so as to limit a generic competi-
tor's market opportunity").
199. See EcONOMIc REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note II, at 10-11 ("Patentees
may succeed in extending the time period of control [e.g.]... through incomplete disclosure,
making it impossible for those without special 'know-how' to use the invention even after
expiration of the patent; . . . through the successive patenting of strategic improvements of the
invention which make the unimproved invention commercially unusable after expiration of the
original patent . . . . The patentee may succeed in extending the scope and strength of the mo-
nopoly beyond that intended by the law."); id. at 28 (reviewing different arguments made by
others that patents have been misused in various ways to inhibit fair and free competition
regardless of efficiency); id. at 31 (quoting Edwards's statement that "[there] are cases in
which one enterprise has held control through patents [of an industry] for periods as long as
half a century").
200. See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 262(k)(7)(C)(i) (West 2012)).
201. See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(1) (West 2012)).
202. See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(II) (West 2012)).
These provisions leave open the possibility of granting new data or market exclusivity terms
for approval of applications for biological products submitted by the same manufacturer that
entail a structural change to an original biological product and that result in a new indication,
route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery system, delivery device, or
strength. Yet, arguably, such re-triggering of the exclusivity period is justifiable since the man-
ufacturer would have to put the biological product through what essentially would be a new
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Patent law, on the other hand, does not seem to have the same kind of
safeguards against abuse. Thus, patents remain relatively susceptible to ev-
ergreening.2 03 Furthermore, the elaborate patent dispute resolution scheme
established in BPCIA might also, conceivably, give rise to different types of
abuse similar to those that have been affected under the Hatch-Waxman
Act.21 Thus, protecting biological products under patent law in addition to
the statutory exclusivities framework available under BPCIA creates an
opening for abuses of the patent system that may delay the entry of generic
biologics into the market.
3. Biological Products Should Not Receive Concurrent
Protection Under Both Patent Law and the Statutory
Exclusivities Afforded Under BPCIA
The conclusion from the discussion thus far is that concurrent protec-
tion of biologics under both patent and statutory exclusivities regimes is not
only unnecessary but also undesirable. Rather, it would be preferable that
any particular biological product be subject to protection under only either
of these regimes at any given time, namely BPCIA instituted statutory ex-
clusivities or patents covering the underlying inventions pertaining to the
biological product.
approval process, including full blown clinical trials, and would therefore need to "re-invest"
in R&D of what may well be viewed as a new and different biological product. Notably, the
BPCIA anti-evergreening provisions are in accord with Professor Kotlikoff's recommenda-
tions for such measures. See KOTLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 9 (proposing to award full monopoly
protection only for the discovery and marketing of a new biologic).
By not affording additional statutory exclusivity for approval of additional indications of
the same biological product, the statutory exclusivity scheme created by BPCIA differs from
that of the Hatch-Waxman Act in that BPCIA does not incentivize additional clinical research
leading to the approval of the same biologic for the treatment of additional medical condi-
tions. See discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act supra note 29 and accompanying text. In
providing such exacting criteria for the grant of statutory exclusivities for already-approved
drugs, BPCIA might actually curb much needed follow-up research of already-approved bio-
logical products, especially with relation to indications that require more complicated or
elaborate R&D efforts which, as such, tend to be "pushed back" for later approval.
203. See Galbraith, supra note 159, at 759 (2009) ("[P]harmaceutical companies have
recently employed a wide variety of 'evergreening' strategies to artificially extend the date a
medication officially goes off patent."). A comprehensive review of the numerous possible
"methods" of patent abuse and "evergreening techniques" in the context of biologics is beyond
the scope of this Article.
204. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRA-
TION: AN FTC STUDY (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf
(describing several types of patent abuse "techniques" used to keep generic competition off
the market); see also FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at viii ("[E]arly start [of pre-approval litiga-
tion] does not guarantee early resolution. . . . [B]ased on the experience under Hatch-Waxman,
a pre-approval patent resolution process also is likely to lead to consumer harm . . . [by using]
the pre-approval patent regulations to delay generic entry. In addition, generic and branded
competitors have entered into 'pay-for-delay' patent settlements that delay entry, not encour-
age it."). Arguably, similar abuses could occur under the pretext of patent dispute resolution
under BPCIA.
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As explained earlier, statutory exclusivities have numerous advantages
over patents.2 05 At least in the context of biologics, patents are a cumber-
some, inefficient, and often ineffective way of "promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."206 FDA granted statutory exclusivities under
BPCIA, on the other hand, appear to be more comprehensive and easily en-
forceable, significantly reduce costs involved in litigation, are less prone to
abuse, and create legal certainty that is currently missing from the protection
of technological innovation under patent law.
Furthermore, statutory exclusivities guarantee that only "worthy tech-
nologies" are granted monopolies. A constant concern in the context of
technological advances is that monopoly grants may be squandered on "un-
worthy" technologies. For instance, it is not uncommon that inventions that
lack any value to society are granted patents just because they happen to
"satisfy" the requirements of patent law. 207 As opposed to the patent exami-
nation process, which mostly utilizes standards not directly relevant to any
particular technology, evaluation of new technologies by specialized agen-
cies directly gauges the "social worth" of such technologies.
The FDA's expertise and understanding in the area of biologics enables
it to evaluate the potential medical benefits of biologics and weigh them
against possible risks, thereby directly determining the true societal value of
specific biological products. 208 The patent system, on the other hand, utilizes
an array of arguably irrelevant "surrogate" or "proxy" standards to indirectly
appraise the societal value of advancements, including biological prod-
ucts. 2" Thus, at least in the context of biologics, a statutory exclusivities
regime has an economic advantage over a patent regime as it is more likely
to guarantee that monopolies are only awarded for "socially valuable" tech-
nologies.
205. See supra Part III.C.I.
206. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
207. There is no shortage of examples of what may be described as ridiculous patents
covering socially worthless technologies. See, e.g., America's Goofiest Patents, TOTALLY AB-
SURD INVENTIONS, http://totallyabsurd.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
208. Direct examination by the FDA presumably guarantees that pharmaceuticals only
receive monopoly via statutory exclusivities based on the criterion of whether they carry suffi-
cient benefit to the public health per se rather than based on surrogate criteria for measuring
their social worth, which may or may not guarantee that they actually convey any benefit to
the public.
209. For example, novelty, nonobviousness, written description, and enablement. See 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-103, 112 (West 2012). The FDA evaluation is directed at the crux of the
issue of benefit for the public, namely, whether the biological product is safe and efficacious
enough to be approved as a medicine and therefore merits statutory exclusivity, regardless of
whether or not a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious or
in compliance with other seemingly irrelevant criteria enumerated in patent law.
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4. A Proposed Amendment to Limit Patent Protection
Where BPCIA Statutory Exclusivities Are in Force
As discussed above, in the area of biologics, a statutory exclusivities re-
gime is preferable to a patent regime. To avoid the negative ramifications of
concurrent protection by both statutory exclusivities and patents, it is advis-
able that upon the onset of the statutory exclusivity period under BPCIA,
developers of the approved products would no longer be able to enforce
their patents as they pertain to the biological products as approved against
generic manufacturers applying for the approval of generic versions of such
products ("proposed amendment").21 0
210. One way of achieving this result would be to amend Title 35 of the U.S. Code to
limit section 271 so that it would create causes of action against generic applicants under
BPCIA only if no statutory exclusivity under BPCIA is in effect with relation to the product
covered by the patent whose enforcement is sought. A possible "softer" version of such a
sweeping prohibition of enforcement of pertinent patents is to have developers of biological
products elect how to protect their proprietary interests in their products, namely by choosing
to benefit from the statutory exclusivities scheme afforded under BPCIA or having the ability
to enforce their patents covering the underlying technologies in the approved biological prod-
uct against generic applicants. To implement this "softer" version of the proposed amendment,
BPCIA could be amended to stipulate that the FDA would refrain from taking the actions
related to the approval of generic versions of the biological products as prescribed under
BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7) (West 2012)) only pursuant to a com-
mitment by a BLA applicant to be estopped from enforcing its patents pertaining to the
approved biological product against such generic applicants or so long as developers of bio-
logical products do not seek enforcement of their patents covering inventions pertaining to
their biological products against parties seeking approval for generic versions of such products
in accordance with BPCIA. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. This "softer" ver-
sion may circumvent possible challenges of the proposed amendment as an unconstitutional
taking of one's proprietary rights in one's patents in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. Importantly, this amendment is not meant to prevent developers of biological
products from enforcing their patents against later applicants seeking approval not under
BPCIA. Namely, developers of biological products would still be able to sue for infringement
of their patents where a competitor might seek FDA approval of the same biological com-
pound for the treatment of the same medical condition by conducting their own clinical trials,
i.e., without relying on the approval of the original biological product under BPCIA.
A possible question is why leaving things the way they are, namely "for the market to take
care of," would not provide a sufficient and satisfying solution to the problems discussed above
arising out of affording double protection to original biological products under both patent and
statutory exclusivities regimes. Arguably, if patents are "so deficient" as a means of protecting
one's proprietary interests in biological products that alternative means-completely outside of
patent law-are necessary to incentivize R&D of biologics, then developers of original biologi-
cal products would be unlikely to seek or pursue enforcement of any patents covering their
biological products and the whole issue of double protection would be moot. However, the
need for the proposed measure limiting the protection afforded to original biological products
is the risk of abuse of patent law (rather than its use for the purposes for which it was intend-
ed). In other words, allowing developers of original biological products to benefit, in the
broad sense, from both patent and statutory exclusivity regimes might lead to their using the
exclusivities under BPCIA for their intended purpose but misusing the protection afforded to
their products under patent law in a manner that does not comport with the purpose for which
patents were created. The measures proposed herein seek to eliminate the risk of such patent
466 [Vol. 18:419
Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities
Importantly, this proposal would "strip" biological products of any addi-
tional period of protection under their primary patents subsequent to the
expiration of the market exclusivity under BPCIA.21" The potential lOSS21 2 Of
this additional protection under patent law (flawed and partial as it may
be2 13) is justified because it reflects payment for insurance embodied in the
statutory exclusivities afforded under BPCIA.21 4 In other words, developers
of original biological products would surrender about 5 to 11 months on
average of exclusivity under patent law in return for 12 to 12.5 years of liti-
gation-free and other legal risks'-free market exclusivity (and 4 to 4.5 years
of data exclusivity).
Further, making it impossible for developers of original biological
products to enforce their primary patents against generic applicants filing for
generic versions of biological products under BPCIA (including after the
expiration of the market exclusivity period) would prevent "double dipping"
by developers of original biological products. 215 Arguably, the length of the
market exclusivity period granted under BPCIA216 should be sufficient to
incentivize R&D in the area of biological pharmaceuticals. There is no justi-
fication for "windfalls" in the form of additional monopoly periods
conferred by primary patents extending beyond the end of the market
exclusivity period in some of the biological products that would further curb
public access to these products. 217
abuse by making patent enforcement unavailable in a narrowly defined set of circumstances
without derogating from the incentives for R&D of biological products.
211. See supra Part III.B.
212. In particular, the five- to eleven-month term of primary patents beyond the expira-
tion of the market exclusivity period under BPCIA is an average number. Thus, while some
products would probably be covered by primary patents whose term is more than five to elev-
en months beyond the market exclusivity period under BPCIA, other products may only be
covered by primary patents (if any) whose term is shorter than the market exclusivity period
under BPCIA. See infra note 217.
213. See discussion supra Part Il.C.I.
214. See discussion supra notes 92 and 143 and accompanying text.
215. To clarify, "double dipping" in this context would be the benefit from both patent
and statutory exclusivities regimes in the context of approval of generic biologics under
BPCIA.
216. The length of the market exclusivity period of 12 to 12.5 years under BPCIA is in
line with the proposals raised by original biologics industry advocates as necessary for the
industry to maintain proper incentives for R&D. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
217. For example, of the seventy-nine products listed in Table 1, fifty-three of the prod-
ucts would have primary patent terms extending beyond the end of the 12-year market
exclusivity, while twenty-six of them would not (the ratio shifts to forty-nine to thirty for a
market exclusivity period of 12.5 years).
Importantly, primary patents covering biological products (which would, under the pro-
posal herein, be unenforceable against generic manufacturers seeking approval of their
products under BPCIA) would still be enforceable against independent developers of the same
biological product and third parties who do not seek to utilize the BPCIA framework and who
would therefore not be subject to BPCIA's statutory exclusivities provisions.
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The proposed amendment is unlikely to discourage continued R&D of
approved biological products (which is intended to lead to improvements of
approved biological products and, possibly, to the development of new
ones).218 This is because the proposed amendment would only apply to
patents that cover biological products as originally approved by the FDA.2 19
To avoid unnecessary legal disputes, there may also be merit in explicitly lim-
iting the proposed amendment so that it would only apply to primary patents
and would not prevent enforcement of secondary patents covering inventions
stemming from continued R&D.220 Such explicit limitation, while potentially
opening the door to abundant litigation involving secondary
patents (with all of its risks of evergreening and patent abuse), would assist in
providing the necessary incentive for continued R&D of already-approved
biologics, which is currently missing from BPCIA. An alternative solution to
the problem of lack of incentive for continued R&D of already-approved bio-
logical products would be to amend 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(c)(ii)(II) so as to
allow for an additional short period of market exclusivity for the approval of
additional medical indications for already-approved biological products simi-
lar to that afforded under the three-year additional statutory exclusivity period
granted under the Hatch-Waxman Act.221
218. It is common in the context of pharmaceuticals that primary patents applied for
early in a product's development process are followed by additional patents claiming (1)
particular ways of formulating the product, (2) additional methods of manufacturing the
API or any of the intermediate compounds involved in making it and (3) additional methods
of using the product or API for treating additional medical conditions [hereinafter "second-
ary patents"]. For example, the biologic Enbrel, which was originally approved for the
treatment of rheumatoid arthritis, later proved effective in the treatment of other autoim-
mune diseases such as psoriasis and Crohn's disease; Avastin, which was originally
approved for treatment of colorectal cancer, was later approved for treating non-small cell
lung cancer and breast cancer. See DiMasi & Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 4-5 (argu-
ing that new indications are an important source of innovative advances in biologics);
Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 4 (reviewing three drugs approved for one condition that
were later approved for other conditions).
219. In the "softer" version mentioned earlier, BLA holders should be estopped only from
enforcing patents covering the original formulation of the approved biologic, the originally ap-
proved indications, the original structure of the biological API, etc. See supra note 210.
The author is aware that in leaving an opening for additional monopoly periods subse-
quent to the expiration of the 12- to 12.5-year statutory exclusivity period in biological
products there remains a risk of abuse by evergreening, which would likely need to be ad-
dressed in litigation.
220. Since there is clear societal interest in encouraging such continued R&D, there is
merit in offering additional incentives for such research in the form of either patents or statuto-
ry exclusivities. As explained earlier, statutory exclusivities under BPCIA are unavailable for
most types of modifications of a previously-approved biological product. See supra notes 200-
202 and accompanying text. Yet, patents may still be available-limited and insufficient as
they might be-as a means of incentivizing invention, investment in R&D, and disclosure of
technology in the context of pharmaceuticals. See supra Parts IlI.C. Ia, IlI.C. I.b, IlI.C. I.d. By
limiting the proposed amendments to primary patents, it would be possible to preserve patents
as means of encouraging further R&D of already-approved biological products.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 204.
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The proposed amendment could also raise concerns that the limitations
it imposes on patent recourse might contradict undertakings by the United
States under patent treaties not to deny patent protection to classes of tech-
nologies as such. 222 However, arguably, the proposed amendment would not
deny protection but rather create a quid pro quo arrangement wherein in
order to benefit from statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, developers of
biological products would only be limited in enforcement of their (undenia-
ble) patent rights under a narrow set of circumstances. 223
Finally, the proposed amendment would not seem to be at odds with the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, that "Congress shall have
Power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discover-
ies," 224 as the constitutional language does not grant a positive right to obtain
patents as such. Rather, the Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress
to devise means of promoting the progress of science and useful arts as it
sees fit, which is exactly what BPCIA does and would continue to do with
the proposed amendment. 225 Furthermore, if the legal situation remains in its
present state, and developers of biological products continue to be able to
utilize both patents and statutory exclusivities concurrently to protect their
proprietary interests in their products, one could argue that the cumulative
protection afforded in biological products is too strong and operates to
222. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) stipulates that
"each Party shall make patents available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
all fields of technology." North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1709(1), Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 605 (NAFTA); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Uruguay Round
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Coun-
terfeit Goods, art. 27(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1994 WL 1711191 (TRIPS) ("patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . .. the field of technology
. . . "); 2000 CRS REPORT, supra note 168, at 26-27 ("[t]he potential for limiting the patenta-
bility of living inventions is moderated by several factors. One source of restraints consists of
international agreements to which the United States is a signatory.").
223. This challenge could also be overcome by adopting the "softer" version of the pro-
posed amendment, under which it would be developers of biological products who would have
the option to pursue their rights under patent law or benefit from the statutory exclusivities
scheme under BPCIA.
224. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
225. Once again, the "softer" version of the proposed amendment could resolve any
constitutional difficulty that may arise in this regard under more conservative constitutional
construction. Namely, even if one is to construe Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitu-
tion narrowly as only granting Congress the ability to "secure[] ... to ... Inventors ...
exclusive Rights" (rather than deny such rights), under the proposed amendments inventors
would choose to benefit from statutory exclusivities by electing to refrain from enforcing their
patents. In other words, it would not be Congress that would deny the inventors' ability to
"secur[e] ... exclusive [r]ights," but rather the inventors themselves who would be making the
choice to limit their own already "secure[d] ... exclusive [patent r]ights" in exchange for the
ability to benefit from the statutory exclusivities afforded under BPCIA.
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obstruct the progress of science and useful arts in abrogation of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause.2 26
5. Why Patents Still Have a Role to Play
in Incentivizing R&D in Biologics
The above conclusions and proposed amendment raise the following
question: if statutory exclusivities are so clearly preferable to patents in the
context of biological products and if patents are not only deficient but possi-
bly even harmful to the interests of developers of biological products and
public interest alike, wouldn't it simply be better to forego patent protection
in biological products altogether?
The answer to this question is no. Despite patents' numerous shortcom-
ings and the clear advantages statutory exclusivities have over them, patents
still have important functions to fulfill in incentivizing the development of
biological products during the period prior to the approval of biological
products by the FDA. Patents serve an important fundraising tool, which
enables R&D entities to raise the funds necessary to support their research
projects. 22 7 In this respect patents have a vital function in the development of
pharmaceutical products and, even more so, of biological products-given
their high R&D costs-as they make it possible for developers of such
products to raise the funds necessary to traverse the numerous expensive
steps of clinical development prior to being eligible to benefit from the
statutory exclusivities under BPCIA (subsequent to approval of the biologi-
cal product by the FDA).
A possible explanation of the "sway" patents may have in convincing
investors to commit funds to certain R&D projects is their ability to prevent
situations of a "race to register."228 In this respect, patents serve not only as a
signaling device between companies but also as means of blocking one's
competitors from entering into such a "race to register" in the first place.
This explanation appears to be especially valid in the context of the biolog-
ics industry, which consists of a significant portion of small to medium
R&D firms. In "race to register" situations, patents improve the survivability
of such small to medium R&D firms competing against major pharmaceuti-
cal corporations during the development stages of biological products prior
226. Such arguments can rely on the various ways in which patents could be abused and
misused in an anti-competitive manner. See supra Part lil.C.2.b. A constitutional analysis of
Congress's power to create the statutory exclusivity scheme under BPCIA appears to merit
further analysis, which exceeds the scope of this Article.
227. Although patents may not provide any additional monopoly period to that afford-
ed by the statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, or directly attest to the prospects of success
of an R&D project that may lead to a biological product, they carry substantial weight with
investors.
228. A "race to register" occurs when two companies undertake a similar research pro-
ject and are competing to have their respective products approved by the FDA first.
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to their approval by the FDA. 229 Thus, patents make it possible for small to
medium R&D outfits to stay in the market to see another day (and, perhaps,
another research project). 230
Accordingly, during the period prior to approval of biological products
by the FDA and the onset of statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, patents
would actually serve as "insurance policies" that make the achievement of
statutory exclusivities possible further down the road. In addition, as dis-
cussed earlier, follow-on patents also have an important role to play
subsequent to the expiration of statutory exclusivity periods under
BPCIA.23 1 To summarize: there is merit in affording biological products
sequential (rather than concurrent) protection from (1) any primary patents
pertaining to the underlying technology in such products prior to the onset
of statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, (2) statutory exclusivities in the
FDA approved products themselves, and (3) any secondary patents pertain-
ing to substantial232 further developments of the originally approved
biological product.
IV. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITIES IN BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS-A PECULIAR CASE OR THE FUTURE
OF INCENTIVIZING INNOVATION?
In view of the foregoing conclusions one cannot help but wonder: is
the regulation of generic biologics a harbinger of a new type of intellectual
property regime wherein patents and statutory exclusivities work in tan-
dem to incentivize R&D? Can we expect to see similar regimes put in
place with respect to other areas of technology? And are there areas of
technology in which it would be desirable to replace the traditional patent
regime with a new regime of statutory exclusivities altogether? As "the
pattern of technical advance varies significantly from field to field" and
from one industry to another, 233 statutory exclusivity frameworks would
not necessarily be similarly suitable for all fields and industries. However,
it is quite possible that because of their lower transaction costs and the
legal certainty they provide, statutory exclusivities could complement
229. Since large corporations usually have more resources, it is expected that with every-
thing else being equal, they will almost always "win" in "race-to-register" situations.
230. Alternatively, early patent applications and patents issued from them make it
possible for small to medium R&D firms to get, at the very least, through the initial proof-of-
concept or pre-clinical testing stages that enable them to sell their research projects to major
pharmaceutical corporations.
231. See supra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
232. The inclusion of the "substantiality" language is meant to clarify that sequential
protection of insubstantial developments of the biological product-which are essentially
evergreening-are not within the scope of legitimate sequential patent protection
described herein.
233. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 880 (1990).
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patents in some areas of technology and possibly even obviate patents al-
together in others. It is thus beneficial to make some observations
regarding the characteristics of areas of technology that may be "candi-
dates" for such a change in technology-protection regime.2 34
Yet, before making any such observations, it is worth highlighting two
prerequisites for the administration of statutory exclusivities regimes. First,
to be a "candidate" for implementation of a statutory exclusivity framework,
a technological area must-just like in the area of pharmaceuticals-be sub-
ject to regulation by a dedicated and qualified impartial body, e.g., an
executive agency capable of administering the regulatory framework insti-
tuting the exclusivities regime. Such a body ought to routinely regulate the
pertinent technological area or have direct bearing on that particular area
and must have a substantial amount of expertise in evaluating technologies
in that area. Given its particular expertise, arguably, such a body would be
better suited than the USPTO to evaluate relevant technologies in its area of
expertise and would therefore be in a better position to make merit assess-
ments with respect to such technologies from a public benefit perspective.
A second prerequisite for the implementation of statutory exclusivities
regimes is that the practical application of technology in the regulated area
requires some kind of regulatory approval or the removal of a regulatory bar.
This requirement is essential for the administration of statutory exclusivities
regimes because it is the withholding of the approval to use the technology
or the imposition of the regulatory bar that effectuates the exclusivities. Nota-
bly, once a technological area is recognized as a potential candidate for the
implementation of a statutory exclusivity framework, it is possible to fulfill
the aforementioned prerequisites-the regulation of the technological area by
a dedicated and qualified impartial body and the existence of a requirement
for regulatory approval or removal of a regulatory bar in order to put technol-
ogy in that area into practical application-via appropriate legislation.
Statutory exclusivities regimes would be suitable primarily in areas of
technology in which (1) additional incentives to invent are necessary be-
cause the existing incentives provided under patent law are insufficient, or
(2) the circumstances of the particular market pertaining to the regulated
technological area lend themselves to inefficiencies such as abuse of market
share. Statutory exclusivities regimes ought not to be considered in areas
that do not call for additional incentives, e.g., areas in which development of
technology is relatively cheap, does not require substantial amounts of
know-how and expertise, or the risks of not recouping one's investments are
234. Such an approach is in concert with the Federal Circuit's general approach of
adapting the legal framework to particular areas of technology. See Aljalian, supra note
155, at 18-19 ("[Platent scope has come to be largely dependent on the technology at issue.
The Federal Circuit actively tailors patent law and policy to the technology under consider-
ation. This new approach is viewed as having 'a significant impact' on advances in
technology and various industries.").
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low. 235 Ideally, statutory exclusivities regimes should be implemented in
technological areas that have high entry barriers-financial, technological,
or both-and where the prospects of return on investment are unpredictable
or involve substantial risks.
As for the question of when, if ever, statutory exclusivities should re-
place patents altogether, it is difficult to establish a bright line rule regarding
the circumstances that would necessitate and justify such replacement.
However, as stated above, it is possible to propose some parameters that
would, potentially, assist in identifying technological areas that may be suit-
able for excepting technology from protection under patent law in favor of
protection under a statutory exclusivities regime. Presumably, these areas
would be those that exhibit extreme cases of the aforementioned characteris-
tics, namely where patent protection provides very little to no incentives (or
even negative incentives 236) to inventlinvest or to disclose new technology or
where the market in the technology that utilizes the pertinent technology is
plagued by constant inefficiencies. Statutory exclusivities may be especially
fitting as a replacement for patents in technological areas that are particular-
ly susceptible or prone to patent abuse.
Notably, the implementation of statutory exclusivities regimes itself is
also not devoid of risks of inefficiencies and abuse. Because statutory exclu-
sivities regimes are based on reliance on expert regulators, risks of
regulatory or agency capture become more prominent. 237 In the context of
approvals of pharmaceutical products by the FDA, for example, this risk is
evident in the fact that FDA personnel is in regular contact with representa-
tives of certain corporations who are prominent and repeated actors in the
regulated area and who are also, frequently, former members of the FDA
staff themselves. Being aware of such risks of regulatory or agency capture
is therefore essential in making sure that there are sufficient checks within
agencies that are to administer statutory exclusivities regimes that may be
provided for by appropriate institutional design. 238
Examples of areas that meet the above criteria and may be suitable for
the application of statutory exclusivities in addition to or in lieu of patents
are the regulation of foods, cosmetics, veterinary pharmaceuticals and
235. Awarding statutory exclusivities in areas that do not require further incentives to
invent, invest in R&D, or disclose technology might work to achieve the opposite results.
236. Hypothetically, there could be areas of technology where the traditional patent
regime is so deficient that it actually creates negative incentives to invent/invest or disclose, in
which case patent protection should be forgone and a statutory exclusivities regime ought to
be made the sole method of protecting technology.
237. Regulatory or agency capture occurs when a regulatory body or agency created to
regulate certain industries or sectors in the public's interest instead advances the commercial
or special interests of the industries or sectors it is charged with regulating.
238. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REv. 15 (2010).
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vaccines,23 9 medical devices240 and diagnostics, and plant breeds.24 1 It is
quite possible that technological advancements in other areas and regulation
thereof would render more and more areas of technology candidates for
supplementation (or possibly even replacement) of the traditional patent
regime with statutory exclusivities.
CONCLUSION
The most important function of patents and statutory exclusivities alike
is to ensure that those partaking in technological R&D not only survive to
continue their activity but also prosper and seek to continue their R&D ac-
tivities in the future. However, in some technological areas, patents might
not serve this purpose as well as statutory exclusivities.
This Article does not purport to propose a "patentless world" or portray
patents as dinosaurs-ancient relics of a once glorious past. As explained
above, statutory exclusivities would and should only serve as an addition to
patents in a narrow class of well-defined circumstances; the emergence of
statutory exclusivities should not be perceived as hailing the demise of the
patent system. Yet, at least in some technological areas, patents may be a
less than preferable way of promoting innovation and should be substituted
by statutory exclusivities where possible.242 Thus, this Article advocates the
substitution of patent enforcement rights with statutory exclusivities of ap-
propriate lengths in those areas where there is a regulatory body capable of
evaluating and granting licenses to partake in activities involving particular
types of patentable technologies and in which the public has an interest in
encouraging further technological development.2 43 Biologics represent such
a case.
239. See generally Animal Health: Veterinary Biologics, USDA-APHIS (June 14, 2010),
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal-health/vet-biologics.
240. See generally 510k Clearances, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 18, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandCle
arances/510kClearances/default.htm.
241. All of these areas are regulated by the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
FDA in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
242. See 2008 CRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 20 (recognizing that patents may not be
"the most successful mechanism for capturing the benefits of investment" in every industry
and arguing that "[t]he utility of patents to companies varies among industrial sectors").
243. This proposition coincides with the belief that
[w]hile the student of the economics of the patent system must, provisionally, dis-
qualify himself on the question of the effects of the system as a whole on a large
industrial economy, he need not disqualify himself as a judge of proposed changes
in the existing system. While economic analysis does not yet provide a basis for
choosing between "all or nothing," it does provide a sufficiently firm basis for deci-
sions about "a little more or a little less" of various ingredients of the patent system.
EcoNoMic REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note I1, at 80.
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In the context of generic biologics, as soon as the statutory exclusivi-
ties instituted by BPCIA kick in, they render primary patents redundant
and, by comparison, an inferior way of ensuring the proprietary interests
of developers of biological products in their technology. The statutory ex-
clusivities afforded under BPCIA have been tailored to the needs of
developers of biological products in the context of generic competition
and should thus be held as sufficient for accommodating those needs. Al-
lowing developers of biological products to benefit from the protection of
primary patents alongside and concurrent with such statutory exclusivities
causes waste and could lead to abuse of the patent system. Further, it is
important to remember that patents, despite their long legal history and
well-known status as instruments of incentivizing innovation, are only a
means to an end. Assuming this "end" is as well or even better served by
other means (e.g., statutory exclusivities), patents may lose their allure and
become redundant and possibly even harmful. A substitution of primary
patent enforcement rights where statutory exclusivities in FDA-approved
biological products are in force is the best means to incentivize continued
investment in R&D while guaranteeing sufficient public access to generic
versions of biological products.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1244
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1 II Ill IV V VI VIl Vill
Twelve- Time from
year Time from expiration of
Patent market patent patent term to
U.S. application FDA Patent exclusivity application end of twelve-
Biological product Patent filing approval expiration expiration to FDA year market
(and API) No. date" date date' date" approval" exclusivity4
Activase@ 4766075 5/5/1982 6/18/1996 8/23/2005 6/18/2008 5158 1030(alteplase) 4
Aldurazyme@ 6426208 11/12/1999 4/30/2003 11/12/2019 4/30/2015 1265 -1657(laronidase)
Amevive@ 5547853 3/12/1991 1/30/2003 1/30/2017 1/30/2015 4342 -731(Alefacept)II
Angiomax@ 5196404 8/18/1989 12/15/2000 3/23/2010 12/15/2012 4137 998(bivalirudin) II
Apidra@ (insulin 6221633 6/18/1998 4/16/2004 6/18/2018 4/16/2016 2129 -793glulisine)
AranespTM  5856298 10/13/1989 9/17/2001 1/5/2016 9/17/2013 4357 -840(darbepoetin alfa)
Arcalyst@ 5470952 10/20/1993 2/27/2008 11/28/2012 2/27/2020 5243 2647
(Rilonacept) I
Avastinm 6884879 4/7/1997 2/26/2004 4/7/2017 2/26/2016 2516 -406(bevacizumab)
Avonex@ (interferon
beta-la; 4530901 2/4/1980 5/17/1996 7/23/2002 5/17/2008 5947 2125
recombinant)
BeneFixTM
(coagulation factor 5171569 3/13/1986 2/11/1997 2/11/2011 2/11/2009 3988 -730
IX)
Betaseron@ ) 4588585 10/19/1982 7/23/1993 7/7/2007 7/23/2005 3930 -714(Interferon beta-1b)
Bexxar@ Therapeutic
Regimen
(Tositumomab and 5595721 9/16/1993 6/27/2003 1/21/2014 6/27/2015 3571 522
Iodine 1-131
Tositumomab)
Byetta@ 5424286 5/24/1993 4/28/2005 12/1/2016 4/28/2017 4357 148(exenatide)
244. All times are in days; all time difference calculations were conducted using date
calculation tools available at http://www.timeanddate.com.
245. Filing date is the patent application effective U.S. filing date for term calculation
purposes.
246. Patent expiration date includes any term extensions and adjustments.
247. Calculated by adding twelve years to the date of FDA approval (column IV).
248. Calculated as the difference in days between the FDA approval date (column IV)
and the patent application filing date (column Ill).
249. Calculated as the difference in days between the twelve-year market exclusivity
expiration date (column VI) and the patent expiration date (column V).
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I II III IV V VI Vil Vill
Cerezyme@ 5236838 12/23/1988 5/23/1994 8/17/2010 5/23/2006 1977 -1547
(imiglucerase)
Cimzia@
(Certolizumab pegol) 7094872 2/19/2004 5/13/2009 7/6/2024 5/13/2021 1910 -1150
200 mg/ml
Elaprase@ 5932211 11/12/1991 7/27/2006 9/3/2019 7/27/2018 5371 
-403(Idursulfase)
Elitek@ 5382518 7/13/1990 7/12/2002 7/12/2016 7/12/2014 4382 -731(rasburicase) 5
Enbrel@ RE36755 9/5/1989 11/2/1998 10/23/2012 11/2/2010 3345 -721(etanercept)
Epogen@ 4703008 12/13/1983 6/1/1989 10/27/2004 6/1/2001 1997 -1244
(epoletin alfa)
ErbituxTM 7060808 6/7/1995 2/12/2004 6//2015 2/12/2016 3172 250(cetuximab)
Fabrazyme@ 5356804 10/24/1990 4/24/2003 9/27/2015 4/24/2015 4565 -156(agalsidase beta)
Forteo@ 4698328 4/4/1985 11/26/2002 4/4/2005 11/26/2014 6445 3523
(teriparatide) I
FuzeonTM 6133418 67/1993 3/13/2003 11/17/2014 3/13/2015 3566 116(Enfuvirtide)
Geref@ (sermoreline 4703035 10/4/1982 12/28/1990 12/28/2004 12/28/2002 3007 -731
acetate)
Gonal-F@ (follitropin 5156957 11/2/1983 9/29/1997 9/29/2011 9/29/2009 5080 -730
alfa)
Herceptin@ 5677171 1/12/1988 9/25/1998 10/14/2014 9/25/2010 3909 -1480(trastuzumab)
HumiraTM 6090382 2/9/1996 12/31/2002 12/31/2016 12/31/2014 2517 731(adalimumab)
Ilaris@ 7446175 8/20/2001 6/17/2009 12/22/2022 6/17/2021 2858 553(Canakinumab) 7
IncrelexTM 5681814 6/7/1990 8/30/2005 9/18/2017 8/30/2017 5563 -19
(mecasermin) I
Infergen@ 4695623 5/6/1982 10/6/1997 9/22/2009 10/6/2009 5632 14(interferon alfacon-1)
Intron A® 4496537 12/23/1981 6/4/1986 1/29/2002 6/4/1998 1624 -1335(alpha-interferon)
IplexTM (mecasermin
rinfabate [rDNA 5681818 3/31/1988 12/12/2005 5/11/2019 12/12/2017 6465 -515
origin))
Kepivance@ 5677278 6/29/1993 12/15/2004 10/14/2014 12/15/2016 4187 793(palifermin)
KineretTM 5075222 5/27/1988 11/14/2001 12/24/2013 11/14/2013 4919 -40(anakinra)
Lantus@ 5101013 8/9/1988 4/20/2000 12/3/2011 4/20/2012 4272 139(insulin glargine)
Leukine@
(Sargramostim -
granulocyte 5391485 8/6/1985 3/5/1991 2/21/2012 3/5/2003 2037 -3275
macrophage colony-
stimulating factor)
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Lucentis@ 6884879 4/7/1997 6/30/2006 4/7/2017 6/30/2018 3371 449
(Ranibizumab)
Luveris@ (lutropin 5639639 11/2/1983 10/8/2004 6/20/2011 10/8/2016 7646 1937
alfa for injection)
Macugen@ 6051698 6 June 12/17/2004 5/19/2015 12/17/2016 2751 578(pegaptanib) 1997
Mircera@
(Methoxypolyethylen 6583272 6/27/2000 11/11/2007 8/26/2020 11/11/2019 2697 -289
e glycol epoetin
beta)
Myobloc@
(Botulinum Toxin 6290961 12/28/1993 8/12/2000 12/28/2013 8/12/2012 2419 -503
Type B)
Myozyme@ 7351410 12/6/1999 4/28/2006 10/29/2020 4/28/2018 2335 -915(Alglucosidase alfa)
Naglazyme@ 6972124 5/1/2000 5/31/2005 7/17/2020 5/31/2017 1856 -1143(Galsulfase) I
Natrecor@ 5114923 5/31/1988 8/10/2001 5/19/2014 8/10/2013 4819 -282(nesiritide) I _I
NeulastaTMpelastim 5582823 8/23/1985 1/31/2002 12/10/2013 1/31/2014 6005 52(pegfilgrastim)I
Neumega@ 5215895 11/22/1989 11/25/1997 11/25/2011 11/25/2009 2925 -730(oprelvekin)
Neupogen@ 4810643 8/23/1985 2/20/1991 3/7/2006 2/20/2003 2007 -1111
(filgrastim)
Nplate@ 6835809 10/22/1999 8/22/2008 10/22/2019 8/22/2020 3227 305(Romiplostim) 6 1
Orenciam 5851795 6/27/1991 12/23/2005 11/25/2017 12/23/2017 5293 28(abatacept) 5 6
Orthoclone OKT3@ 4361549 4/26/1979 9/14/1992 11/30/1999 9/14/2004 4890 1750(muromonab-CD3)
Ovidrel@ (human
chorionic 4840896 11/2/1983 9/20/2000 4/29/2009 9/20/2012 6167 1240
gonadotropin)
PEG-IntronTM
(pegylated interferon 5951974 11/10/1993 1/19/2001 1/19/2015 1/19/2013 2627 -730
alfa-2b)
Proleukin, IL-2@ RE33653 10/19/1982 5/5/1992 5/5/2006 5/5/2004 3486 -730(aldesleukin)
ProstaScint@(Capro 5162504 6/3/1988 10/28/1996 10/28/2010 10/28/2008 3069 -730
mab Pendetide)
RaptivaTM  6037454 11/20/1997 10/27/2003 11/20/2017 10/27/2015 2167 -755(efalizumab)
ReFacto@
(antihemophilic 4868112 4/12/1985 3/1/2000 2/28/2010 3/1/2012 5437 732
factor)
Regranex@ 4845075 2/25/1985 12/16/1997 10/29/2010 12/16/2009 4677 -317(Becaplermin)
Remicade@ 5656272 3/18/1991 8/24/1998 8/12/2014 8/24/2010 2716 -1449(infliximab)
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RemodulinTM 5153222 6116/1989 5/21/2002 10/6/2014 5/21/2014 4722 -138(treprostinil sodium)
RetavaseTM  5223256 2/6/1990 10/30/1996 10/30/2010 10/30/2008 2458 -730(reteplase)
Rituxanb) 5763137 7/29/1996 11/26/1997 7/29/2016 11/26/2009 485 -2437(rituximab)
Roferon 4503035 11/24/1978 4/6/1986 3/5/2002 4/6/1998 2690 -1429(Interferon alfa-2a)I
Simulect@ 6521230 3/14/1991 12/5/1998 2/18/2020 12/5/2010 2823 -3362(Basiliximab) I
Soliris@(Ecuizua) 6074642 5/2/1994 3/16/2007 5/2/2014 3/16/2019 4701 1784(Eculizumab)I
Somavert@ 5849535 9/21/1995 3/25/2003 3/25/2017 3/25/2015 2742 -731(pegvisomant)
(stekuma) 6902734 8/1/2001 9/25/2009 7/26/2022 9/25/2021 2977 -304(Ustekinumab)
SynagisTM 5824307 12/23/1991 6/19/1998 10/20/2015 6/19/2010 2370 -1949(palivizumab) I
Tarceva@ 5747498 6/6/1995 11/18/2004 11/8/2018 11/18/2016 3453 -720(Erlotinib) I I
Thyrogen@ 5240832 6/20/1989 11/30/1998 8/31/2010 11/30/2010 3450 91(thyrotropin alfa)
TNKaseTM 5385732 5/20/1988 6/2/2000 6/2/2014 6/2/2012 4396 -730(tenecteplase)
Tysabri@ 5840299 1/25/1995 11/23/2004 4/27/2017 11/23/2016 3590 -155(natalizumab) III
Vectibix@ 6235883 5/5/1997 9/27/2006 5/5/2017 9/27/2018 3432 510(Panitumumab)
VelcadeTM
(bortezomib for 5780454 10/28/1994 5/13/2003 5/3/2017 5/13/2015 3119 -721
injection)
Veriuma 4897255 1/14/1985 10/13/1998 8/20/2010 10/13/2010 5020 54(Notetumomab) ._ _ _ _
Visudynem
(verteporfin for 5095030 1/20/1987 4/12/2000 9/9/2011 4/12/2012 4831 216
injection)
XigrisTM RE37806 4/9/1986 11/21/2001 11/21/2015 11/21/2013 5705 -730(drotrecogin alfa)
Xolair® 6267958 3/14/1996 6/20/2003 6/20/2017 6/20/2015 2654 -731(omalizumab)
Zenapax 5530101 12/28/1988 10/12/1997 6/25/2013 10/12/2009 3210 -1352(Daclizumab) I
ZevalinTM
(ibritumomab 5776456 11/13/1992 2/1912002 2/1912016 2/19/2014 3385 -725
tiuxetan)
Average 3728.35 -326.95
Spring 2012]1 479

